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This publication has been edited with Open-source software OpenOffice and Gimp. We have used Garamond for our main-body text and titles and LHF New Trajan for the logo.

Cover page: Cavalry Battle (1600s) by Jan Martszen de Jonge, privately held.
Foreword

As will become apparent, there have been some adjustments made to the Strife Journal since Issue Two. We hope the most discreet will prove to be the change in editorship: our thanks are due to Pablo de Orellana, who has stepped down after two issues’ toil at the helm, and we hope we can continue his excellent work.

Other modifications are more cosmetic, and hence perhaps more obvious. The font and formatting is slightly different, and we also have a new logo, aligning us with the blog (at www.strifeblog.org) and illustrating more clearly than ever how unified the Strife project is across blog and journal. As in the last issue, we have reprinted an extract from our online counterpart: the excellent five-part series on drone warfare entitled ‘The Good, The Bad, The Drones’, which was posted online over the course of April.

The other major change has been the revamping and expansion of the reviews section, thanks for which must go to my co-editor Nikolai Gourof. We have four reviews this issue, on texts ranging from early modern history to (post)modern political theory. Issue four will see this section expand further.

Of course, the skeleton of Strife Journal has been and remains its extended pieces, and there are four in this issue. Nikolai Gourof writes about Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan The Terrible, and draws parallels between it and Stalin’s contemporary regime. Alexander Langer, meanwhile, draws attention to Church resistance against state oppression in Latin America. Langer speculates as to why the state responses to broadly similar resistance movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador took such different forms. Alexandra Gallovicova’s piece is another Strife first: it is split into two instalments, the first of which is printed here, the second of which will be published in Issue Four. In her first part, Gallovicova explores the idea of the ‘image’ in IR theory, and lays firm groundwork for the case study that will form her piece’s second instalment: French and British perceptions of Germany in the wake of its abstention from the UN Security Council vote on establishing a no-fly zone in Libya during the 2011 Libyan Civil War. Finally, Thomas Colley looks at propaganda in the Yugoslav conflict of the 1990s. Colley asks whether any of the lessons learnt then can be applied to the current crisis in Ukraine.

As always, many thanks are due to the department of War Studies at King’s College London, which has provided unceasing support. Special thanks are due to Dr Christine Cheng, Prof. Vivienne Jabri, Dr Oisin Tansey, Prof. Mats Berdal and Dr Kieran Mitton. Thanks are of course also owed to all the contributors to this issue, who have handled our editorial demands with grace and rapidity. We have continued with the peer-review model established in Issue 2, and we thank all our reviewers.

We are always on the lookout for interesting perspectives on conflict for both the journal and the blog; anyone interested in contributing is encouraged to pitch an idea or simply declare interest via email.

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Stalinist Visions of Empire: Sergei Eisenstein’s *Ivan The Terrible*,
Part I

N. A. Gourof

‘I must be cruel, only to be kind’.

*Hamlet*, Act III, Scene 4, 179.¹

‘You must firmly remember that of all art forms the most important to us is the moving pictures’.² With these words, Vladimir Lenin formulated in 1922 the attitude of the Soviet state towards cinema. Recognised very early on as a powerful tool of propaganda and ideological education, the cinema enjoyed unprecedented support by the ruling Communist Party throughout the Soviet era, and especially in its most turbulent decades, when Joseph Stalin succeeded Lenin at the helm of the young Socialist state. A detailed analysis of early Soviet cinema is outside the scope of the present discussion. We will therefore limit ourselves to examining, specifically within the context of imperial discourse, the ideological trends set by the Party leadership at the height of Stalin’s rule, as illustrated by the case of Sergei Eisenstein’s epic biography, *Ivan the Terrible*, one of the masterpieces of Soviet and world cinematography.

A film about Ivan the Terrible, the first crowned Russian Tsar, was an idea conceived by Stalin himself, who saw in the history of the medieval monarch’s reign a parallel to his own era. At the same time, this idea fitted well within the general attitude of Soviet, Party-defined cinematography towards the Russian past. ‘It was precisely in the Middle Ages’, writes Evgeny Dobrenko, ‘and on its very borders with the New Era that Stalinism sought and found the demanded “analogy with the present” and that Soviet historicising art solved the main problems – of the State, power and violence’.³ A competent director was requested to breathe life into the project and the Minister of Cinematography, Ivan Bol’shakov, suggested Sergei Eisenstein for the task.

Eisenstein was by then one of the top Soviet directors. Son to a prominent architect, he grew up in the liberal circles of the old Russian intelligentsia, forming friendships and collaborating with many of its greatest representatives, like Vladimir Mayakovsky and his circle. Well educated, multi-lingual, a true Renaissance man, a writer, a painter, a poet, an actor, a photographer, a theoretician of the visual, he eventually became a student of the great theatre director Vsevolod Meyerhold, many of whose ideas and experimentations he would develop further and apply to the new medium of the age, the cinema. By the beginning of the 1940s, he was already a famous film director, the creator of, among others, such masterpieces as *Stachka [The Strike]* (1924), *Bronenosets Potyomkin [The Battleship Potemkin]* (1925), and the highly influential *Alexander Nevsky* (1938), the first major attempt of Stalinist cinema to revive images of a glorious medieval Russian past and use them as a statement in contemporary politics.⁴

⁴ Peter Kenez, ‘Films of the Second World War’, in Anna Lawton, (ed.), The Red Screen: Politics, Society, Art in Soviet Cinema, Routledge, 1992, pp. 163-164. In many ways, Eisenstein developed in *Ivan the Terrible* ideas already present in some form or other in *Alexander Nevsky*, whose closing lines – ‘Who comes at as with the sword, will die by the sword’ – are a statement of power vividly linking the two films.
Ivan the Terrible, shooting for which began in 1941 in Alma-Ata, was conceived as a massive, three-part epic narration which would unite ideas of past and modernity, empire and rule, vision and the strategy to make it reality. Part I would discuss the newly-crowned Tsar’s first struggles with the boyars and his first major military victory – the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’. Part II, subtitled The Boyar Conspiracy, would revolve around the Oprichnina and the culmination of the Tsar’s fight against the decadent forces seeking to fragment his young empire. Growing increasingly darker as the historical character moves from suspicion to paranoia, the film, in Part III, would refocus the action upon a foreign conflict brought about by traitors, the disastrous Livonian war of 1558-1583, before providing a cathartic culmination.

The script was submitted to and personally approved by Stalin, who remained closely connected to the project, discussing it extensively with Eisenstein and Alexander Cherkasov, the lead actor, offering criticism and advice. Despite this intimate involvement, it is perhaps too hasty to judge the film as a purely Stalinist creation. Indeed, the director managed often to express his own interpretation and critique, especially in Parts II and III, which is the reason they were ultimately suppressed. But in all, Ivan the Terrible, especially Part I, still remains a vivid portrayal of the Stalinist vision of empire at a time when Russia was moving west, and already considering a post-war reconstruction on the inside and a diplomatic repositioning on the outside.

Central to the ideas of empire in Ivan the Terrible is the extended introductory sequence depicting a milestone event, both for the film and for Russian history: Ivan’s coronation as Tsar. Interestingly, the coronation scene was not intended to form the film’s beginning. Eisenstein wanted to start with Ivan’s childhood, a brief portrayal of the Boyar regency, bloody and traitorous to himself and the interests of Muscovy, and the young prince’s first rebellion against the boyars. However, the image of weakness the boy-Tsar projected was deemed inappropriate. Accordingly, the action was decided to begin

5 Ivan Grozny: Boyarskij zagovor [Ivan the Terrible. Part II: The Boyar Conspiracy], dir. by Sergei Eisenstein, Mosfilm/TsOKS, 1944/45. Part II was intensely disliked by Stalin and was released only in 1958, during the de-Stalinisation years of the Khruschev era, the so-called Khruschev Thaw. Part III remained unfinished, and most of the reels were destroyed. The surviving excerpts were included in the documentary Neiznesnyj Ivan Grozny [The Unknown Ivan the Terrible], dir. by Naum Kleiman et al., Gosfilmofond Rossi, 1998.
8 For a brief overview of the actual event see Isabel de Madariaga, Ivan the Terrible, First Tsar of Russia, Yale University Press, 2005, pp. 49-53.
with Ivan’s coronation, introduced by fanfare and shots of text, the latter especially vivid in the parallels it draws between Ivan and Stalin: ‘This film is about the man, who in the XVI century for the first time unified our country; about that Prince of Moscow, who from separate, and fragmented, and individualistic principalities created a unified, powerful state; about a military leader who elevated the military glory of our homeland in the East and in the West; about a sovereign, who for the resolution of these great tasks for the first time placed upon his head the Crown of All Russia’.9

The theme of the individual in the film is a recurring one, both a hymn and an allusion to the Stalinist cult of personality. In 1940, some time before beginning to work on Ivan the Terrible, Eisenstein wrote: ‘If we take the majority of successful films, we see that the most successful images (...) occur when there are literary prototypes available’.10 It is plausible to assume that Eisenstein was on some level creating exactly such a literary figure in his Ivan, a figure much more symbolically and ideologically expanded than the hero of his Alexandr Nevsky epic, a complex historical and literary prototype for a successful contemporary ruler. Such a ruler, almost like the glorious medieval hero reborn, would surely have a lasting imperial vision to offer, the strength to build on it, and the power to sustain it.11

Be that as it may, both the introductory text and the imagery succeeding it project power as the core element of the Eisensteinian/Stalinist imperial discourse. Power is the most important legitimising factor for the new empire, as attested by the commentary provided by the foreign dignitaries attending. When several of them murmur that Ivan has no right to the imperial title and that Europe will not recognise him as Tsar, the Livonian ambassador turns to his secretary and delivers a key phrase: ‘If he be powerful, they will recognise him’. The parallel is obvious. After struggles to be accepted as an equal on the European diplomatic arena, the newly-formed Soviet State is largely recognised only when becoming powerful enough to potentially project its force outside its boundaries. To assure the viewer of the certainty of this eventual recognition, a background dialogue is used almost surreptitiously: when discussing the attending boyars, one of the foreigners keeps referring to Ivan as the Grand Prince. Suddenly another voice corrects him, rephrasing his last words: ‘...not of the Grand Prince, but of the Tsar!’

The coronation scene, which sets the tone for the whole narration, is both a visual and a textual statement. The visual part, which comes first, gives us immediately recognisable elements of historicity and historical continuity: the imperial regalia, especially the crown, the so-called cap of Monomach, allegedly given to Ivan’s ancestors by the Byzantine Emperor

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9 All translations are my own, unless otherwise stated.
thus nicknamed; the Byzantine ceremony itself, a further symbol of legitimizing continuity; the interior of the Cathedral of the Dormition in the Moscow Kremlin, as well as Orthodox music. It also gives a first glimpse of the national element of Eisenstein’s empire, by providing a clear divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, placing the Russian interiors and the distinct appearance of the Muscovites vis-à-vis the faces and fashion of the foreign dignitaries attending. Here Eisenstein uses the variety in art forms, placing elements of traditional Russian folk and Church imagery (national dress, Orthodox iconography, distinct architecture) next to the so-called Dutch portrait tradition — unbent ruffs, ascetic faces, and black garments.

The shots of Ivan receiving the imperial regalia form the visual prologue to his vocal assertion of power, his coronation speech. This contains a coherent political program, mirroring the priorities of the historical Ivan, as well as the interests of the Stalinist regime itself, and of Soviet policy since the Bolsheviks’ rise to power in general. Unity is the new empire’s main structural characteristic, both for Ivan and for the Soviet state, a federation of many smaller republics - fragments united under a single political formation. Ivan proclaims, that by crowning himself Tsar he puts an end ‘now and for ever to the evil fragmentation of rule’, perpetrated by the power élites of the past, personified here by the boyars. He proclaims unequivocally: ‘From now on the Russian land will be one and united!’, and gives a clear justification of this soon thereafter: ‘Because only in a unified, strong empire, amalgamated [into one] on the inside, one can be strong on the outside’.

Another identification between ruler and state follows, again similar to the contemporary realities of Stalinist Russia, but enriched by elements of legitimizing historical continuity. Ivan is crowned Emperor [Tsar] as the successor of the Byzantine tradition, one and supreme ruler of the Third Rome: ‘Two Romes fell’, he proclaims, ‘while the Third, Moscow, stands. And there will be no Fourth Rome. And of that Third Rome, the Moscow dominion, from now on the only master will be I. Alone!’ A powerful visual illustration here is the shot of Ivan’s face with the shadow of the symbol of the empire, the two-headed eagle, falling on it. With these textual and visual elements the individual - a ruler, a visionary, a moderniser - is placed at the centre of the Russian imperial experience.

What are then the means for securing and preserving this Third Rome, which still stands in the 1940s, but is now confronting a foreign enemy? Power, specifically military might, a permanent, state-controlled, modernised force: ‘But for the Russian land to continue to be united under one hand, power is needed. And for this reason we establish an army, a serving,

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12 In traditional historiography Ivan was seen as the ideological predecessor of Peter the Great, a ruler concerned with centralisation, modernity, secularisation, expansion towards the sea.
gun-bearing, permanent [army]."¹³ This idea of the loyal host will again emerge, in a slightly different context, in the end of Part I, and more vividly in Part II, with the oprichniki, the Tsar’s bodyguard established to protect him from treacherous boyars and acting as the army of interior stabilisation. But for the moment, in the speech, the element of power and powerful rule comes back again and again, hammering the idea into the mind of the viewer: ‘We need powerful rule! In order to break the backs of all those who are hostile to the unity of the Russian State.’

Fig. 7. ‘I. Alone.’ The new Caesar (Tsar) is ‘branded’ with the Byzantine double-headed eagle

Expansionist and imperialist tendencies are given a patrimonial justification that is both historically accurate and contemporarily useful in light of the Soviet interests in the war-torn Baltic, the Crimea, and the remote Pacific coast: ‘The coastal possessions of our forefathers are separated forcefully from our own land... And for this reason, on this day We crown ourself master [also] of those lands, which for the moment are under other rulers.’ The sea is a traditional feature in Russian literature, historiography and political discourse, remaining an important ideological symbol of Russia’s entry into modernity. However, the first step towards realising a new modernising vision is to resolve the issues within the existing sphere of influence. Accordingly, soon after the coronation, the Kazan’ plotline becomes the focal point of the narration, showing the ruler acting upon his political promises and declarations.

The sequences dedicated to the conquest of Kazan’ provide interesting material for the reconstruction of the film’s imperial theme. Empire here is a vibrant and expanding organism which uses its power and superiority in military technology to establish supremacy over its enemies and to grow to accommodate its strategic and even ideological goals. It is an empire of modernity, bombarding the antiquated feudal walls with its cannons, positioned on screen in such a way as to resemble the tanks spearheading at that very time the Soviet offensives against another foreign enemy.¹⁴ The empire’s morality is here simple and accessible to the viewer. The radiant sun on Ivan’s chainmail is a symbol of light, a symbol of day, of dawn, a symbol of his vision, a force of light battling the forces of darkness under the symbol of the crescent moon, an incomprehensible foe who kills his own kind (the captured Tatars who are tied before the city’s walls are killed by the defenders’ arrows).

The Kazan’ sequence however, is used as an opportunity to contrast the foreign foe with the enemy who is to strike from within. The theme of an internal ‘other’ is vividly illustrated by the first appearance of Prince Andrey Kurbsky on the field. His clearly Western military attire only features briefly, as Kurbsky is from then on seen in the traditional Russian chainmail and helmet. As Eisenstein made extensive preliminary sketches of the entire film, it is highly unlikely that this scene was a chance mistake. To a viewer carrying fresh memories of Stalin’s purge of the Red Army high command in 1938, which culminated in the arrest and execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky, Eisenstein is loudly announcing the traitor who will challenge the Tsar’s authority. The following scenes, which demonstrate the changing attitudes between Kurbsky and Ivan, is concluded with words which shift the focus of the viewer’s antipathy from the foreign foe to the internal one. ‘The Boyars’ hatred is worse than Tatar arrows’, Ivan is told by Basmanov as

¹³ Streletsksoye vojsko is a term describing permanent harquebusier and musketeer formations established by Ivan. Strel’tsy-lit. gunners.

¹⁴ Such contemporary references are not new to Eisenstein, who, in his Alexander Nevsky, included swastikas and Nazi-like helmets among the attributes of the invading German knights.
he introduces himself, and the Tsar immediately retorts: ‘I will remember the name of the boyar-hater’. ‘New people’ like Basmanov will be instrumental in crushing the internal ‘other’ who challenges the Tsar’s authority. Kurbsky, a friend from the past, a boyar, a remnant of the old state of things will soon betray Ivan - the Tsar by joining the Polish King, and Ivan - the man, by attempting to seduce his wife Anastasia.

It is interesting to note here, that the conquest of Kazan’ bore many of the characteristics of a crusade, and its history always contained powerful religious connotations. Yet Eisenstein’s empire, the protagonist in this event, has little to do with religion. This is evident already from the first scenes of the film, and can be traced throughout the trilogy. Images of religion, the Church and churchmen had to be retained for the sake of historicity, but it is clear that the Church was portrayed with hostility, and pushed artificially to the background. The almost contemptuous tone with which Ivan says during his coronation ‘Also the monasteries...’ is a clear indication of that, especially followed by the expression of shock and surprise on the faces of the Metropolitan and the other churchmen when the Tsar announces his intention to use Church wealth for state purposes, specifically to fund his wars. It is also attested by their portrayal as traitors, and as collaborators in the minor conspiracy during Ivan’s illness. The issue of religion in general, even simple faith is left uncommented. The Church remains the sole target of the politico-spiritual world of the empire. Accordingly, the religious element is completely omitted in the Kazan’ war plotline. The Tatars are represented as a national enemy, not a religious one. The call to arms upon the appearance of the Khanate’s envoy, and the people’s reaction to it, are both religiously neutral (if not entirely mute). They are, however, nationally and politically passionate. Eliminating the religious theme entirely, Eisenstein offers no crosses to juxtapose the shadows of the Muslim crescents on the walls, only berdishi [pole-axes] and the beards of the Ivan-led Russian muzhiki. It is the latter, not the boyars or churchmen, but the plebeian muzhiki, who will ultimately support his ventures, become his soldiers, protect his life and share his vision. Not God’s will, not the decadent nobles, but the force of the humble proletariat, the low-born pushkari [cannoneers] and oprichniki, led by their vozhd’ are to be the architects of the new empire.

An interesting element in the context of this secular vision is the lik [face in Russian iconographic tradition] of Christ on the wall before which the vacillating Kurbsky thinks, prays, and later attempts to seduce Ivan’s wife. Though drawn as an icon, it obviously represents not Christ, but Ivan himself, and it is Ivan’s ever-seeing eye which hints at the omnipresence of the ruler, his supreme knowledge, and prepares the viewer for the protagonist’s final judgement. The all-seeing eye, one of the most vivid examples of Meyerholdian and Eisensteinian visual and montage technique, is here not a religious or mystical symbol, but rather a vivid visual representation of the power of the absolute ruler.

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To commemorate his victory and the conquest of Kazan’, Ivan commissioned a majestic icon, *The Church Militant*, and the magnificent Cathedral of the Holy Mother of Kazan’.

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15 To commemorate his victory and the conquest of Kazan’, Ivan commissioned a majestic icon, *The Church Militant*, and the magnificent Cathedral of the Holy Mother of Kazan’.

16 Lit. ‘leader’ in Russian, but in Soviet common parlance denoted the leader of the Party and the government, much like the German word ‘führer’.

This near-omnipotence of the ruler is also alluded to in another scene, which takes us into a discussion of foreign policy, the audience of the Tsar’s emissary Iosip Nepeya regarding an alliance with Elizabethan England. The Tsar is represented here as two entities, a man, and a head, in the form of Ivan’s shadow, literally the head of the state, dominating both the room and the discussion about to begin. The individual character of the ruler keeps central stage, here not in juxtaposition with boyars, churchmen or other contestants for power, but alone, the supreme decision-maker in the act of policymaking. Seemingly what the scene hints at is that an empire can not exist in isolation, at least for the moment. But the ‘collaborative’ character of the discussion is soon transformed by the powerful, clearly theatrical image of the Tsar’s shadow leaning forward and spreading itself over the globe, revealing, one could say, the true face of diplomacy, the ruthless, Machiavellian character of foreign policy dominated by a modern realpolitik approach. Less ominously read this vision of world domination is perhaps a visual expression of a core ideological point of the Soviet communist doctrine, the ideal finale of the socialist effort, its ideological climax - the global establishment of communism. It is not far-fetched to see in this the transformation of Russia into an empire with an important role, a distinct, and distinctly positive global mission, to remake the future.

The theme of state, statehood and empire is thus central to the film. Eisenstein’s empire is presented as a creature of the new, industrial century - modern, secular, ‘of the people’, aggressive in foreign policy, imposing in its interior control, concerned with centralised administrative monopoly, with expansion and domination, founded on the politics of common sense, on realpolitik. Legitimacy is a major element. Formal legitimacy, however, asserted through ritual, regalia, titulature and connections to a glorious past, Byzantine, Christian or other, is spiritless, all these elements remaining a mere façade, a courteous bow of sorts towards tradition. The true legitimising factor, the core essence of the Eisensteinian/Stalinist empire is supreme power, and superiority asserted by force of arms (vojsko), by a unifying rule, by aggressively realised geopolitical goals. At the centre of this imperial ideal stands a great personality, a leader imposing in presence and ideas, a man of strength, a man of vision, one who can make this vision a reality.

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‘All Authority Comes From God’: State Response to Catholic Church Opposition in El Salvador and Nicaragua (1972-1980)
Alexander Langer

On 3 August 1959, Monseñor Vicente Alejandro Gonzalez y Robleto, Archbishop of Managua and leader of Nicaragua’s Catholic Church, advised Catholics on the permissibility of political action under a tyrannical government:

You should all know, as the Apostle says, all Authority comes from God, and all things are arranged by that same God. Therefore he who resists that Authority, resists God, the arrangement undertaken by God, and in doing so condemns himself.
(Romans 13:21)

Gonzalez continued, counselling ‘Christian patience and fervent pleas to God’ as the proper solution to state avarice and brutality. Yet, only twenty years later, the bishops of Nicaragua, under the leadership of Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo stated:

All of us are hurt and affected by the extremes of revolutionary insurrections, but its moral and juridical legitimacy cannot be denied in the case of evident and prolonged tyranny, which seriously threatens the fundamental rights of the individual and undermines the common good of the country.

A similar attitude towards opposition to repressive regimes can be found in the writings and public addresses of Óscar Romero, the Archbishop of San Salvador, murdered on 24 March 1980 by a right-wing death squad.

Romero claimed in 1980 that ‘These are insurrectional times. The morality of the Church permits insurrection when all other paths have been exhausted.’

Yet, while Romero was assassinated and the Church in El Salvador faced shocking violence and repression at the hands of the state and allied paramilitary death squads, the Nicaraguan Church was left largely alone, with its leadership remaining unharmed even as they openly called for the downfall of the Somoza regime. The 1970s saw steadily increasing state repression of the Catholic Church and its ministry in El Salvador in reaction to Catholic-liked opposition, particularly from the grassroots ‘progressive Church’ but also from the Church hierarchy. By contrast, in Nicaragua the state response to similar Church opposition was less coherent, especially in response to the more moderate opposition that emerged from Archbishop Obando y Bravo and the Church hierarchy.

This paper seeks to explain why the states of Nicaragua and El Salvador reacted so differently faced with outwardly similar forms of resistance from the Catholic Church leadership. The paper finds that these two states reacted differently to Church opposition due to differences in regime structure, ideology and the nature of the broader insurrection faced by each regime. The Somoza regime in Nicaragua was largely non-ideological, focusing on maintaining the power and privilege of the Somoza family and their clique; the Salvadoran regime subscribed to a form of authoritarian liberalism highly intolerant of social groups or institutions standing in the way of the elite’s definition of ‘progress’. Regime structures reflected this division, with the Somoza regime alternately repressing and co-opting various social groups to sustain their position. By contrast, El Salvador’s state apparatus acted as...

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the repressive instrument for the dominant economic and social elite of the landed oligarchs and the military.

The roots of the ideological and structural distinctions between the regimes of Nicaragua and El Salvador can be seen as early as the late 19th century. Following independence from Spain in 1821, then Mexico in 1823, Central America was unified into a federation. By 1838, this federation had dissolved, with the modern republics of Central America forming. Throughout the mid-19th century, the republics of Nicaragua and El Salvador saw constant political upheaval and frequent fraternal war, with power switching between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Liberals tended to support decentralization, anti-clericalism, free-market economics and private property, while Conservatives tended to support traditional institutions such as the Church, indigenous communal landholding and quasi-feudal property arrangements. Neither respected systems of democratic governance, with political activity restricted largely to elites.

By the late 19th century though, the two countries had diverged. Nicaragua had seen the consolidation of Conservative political dominance following the expulsion of American adventurer and self-proclaimed President William Walker, whereas El Salvador saw the consolidation of Liberal rule linked to the rapidly expanding coffee economy. This meant that in Nicaragua, the church worked in partnership with the state and was granted special privileges and political access in exchange for legitimization of the regime. In contrast, El Salvador in the late 19th century saw the entrenchment of a Church that, while conservative and supportive of state authority, was clearly subordinated to the power of the Liberal-dominated state administration. Nicaragua during this period saw the institutionalization of Church involvement in personal law, education and the economy. Liberal politicians would eventually make peace with Nicaraguan Church influence as part of their bid to return to power; this bargain lasted through the period of American suzerainty of the 1920s and 30s, and into the rule of the Somocista dynasty.\(^4\)

Under the rule of Anastasio Somoza Garcia and his sons, the state lost even the thin veneer of political ideology that the Liberal and Conservative parties had maintained. Somocismo’s primary goal was the personal aggrandizement and enrichment of the Somoza family, and to a lesser extent their extended families, cronies, and the National Guard — the country’s main security force controlled personally by Somoza. The regime was thus characterized by the balancing of various social and political groupings against each other. This is typical of an ‘autonomous personalist state’, whereby the state is free from the control of any particular social class, instead seeking to benefit the specific ruling clique that controls it. The Church, as part of this political balancing act, became a loyal and key ally of the regime. The political bargain between the Church and the Somoza regime was cast in the same mould as those between the Church and previous governments. Catholic priests and the Church establishment would act as a legitimizing force for the regime, counselling acceptance of the political order among their congregants and offering public legitimation. This legitimation came through attendance and the religious blessing of political activities such as the opening of Congress, as well as bestowing accolades on Somoza and members of his clique, such as crowning Somoza’s daughter ‘Queen of the Army’ in a lavish ceremony. In exchange, the Church gained influence in areas of traditional concern, particularly enforcement of ‘public morals’ (sexual and gender norms), combatting the scourge of Communism and Protestantism, control over the education system and personal-status law, as well as material benefits for the Church hierarchy in land and luxury consumer goods.\(^5\)

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In El Salvador, on the other hand, the Catholic Church was largely excluded from a role in the state. Beginning in the mid-19th century El Salvador was dominated by a landowning oligarchy known as the ‘fourteen families’ whose wealth stemmed from domestic coffee production. This oligarchy sought to break with the Church-dominated past and ruled under a framework of authoritarian liberalism. European values were emulated, with the culture of the countryside seen as primitive and barbaric. This included the Church, a stronghold of conservative values that stood in the way of the dominance of the ‘coffee republic’. Liberal rulers, beginning with President Geraldo Barrios in 1859, supported the establishment of secular schools and universities, removed the Church from involvement with legal administration, and revoked many of the remaining privileges it had maintained since independence. The Church hierarchy took this in stride, allying with the state in its repression and expropriation of the cofradías, autonomous Catholic communities that often doubled as communal landholding systems. This authoritarian political system, which subordinated the population to the demands of the market and the coffee oligarchy in a quest for modernization, was entrenched by the end of the 19th century. It formed a ‘non-hegemonic instrumentalist state,’ ruled by and for a particular social class; in this case the El Salvador coffee-growing elite.\(^6\)

By the early 20th century, the elite was internally divided between ‘agro-financial’ and ‘agro-financial-industrial’ groups. The former rejected any reform of the prevailing system due to their economic focus on landholdings, while the latter supported cautious political and economic reform, meant to boost industrial growth and reduce political pressure within an elite-controlled democratic framework. These groups competed for power primarily through a restricted, sham democracy along with periodic military coups. Both groups agreed that suppression of the peasantry was necessary. \(La Matanza\), the 1932 massacre of close to two percent of the Salvadoran population and nearly the entire indigenous population in response to a small rural uprising, was only the most extreme example of repression from this period.\(^7\) Already, there was a clear difference in the social position and level of repression faced by the Catholic Church in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

The shift in the policies of the religious establishment in both Nicaragua and El Salvador can be drawn back to two key years: 1968 and 1972. 1968 is extremely important due to the Conference of Latin American Bishops, held in Medellín, Colombia. The conference agreed to embrace many of the reforms of Vatican II, with support for a ‘preferential option for the poor’ and the creation of ‘Christian Base Communities’ (CEBs) to teach impoverished people to read and organise through Biblical study. These reforms were cautiously embraced by Luis Chávez y González, Archbishop of San Salvador, as well as Archbishop Obando y Bravo in Managua, appointed in 1970. While in both countries the ‘people’s church’ or Iglesia Popular was already being promoted by radical priests, this stamp of institutional approval aided their growth.

The year 1972 also saw traumatic events for each nation that undermined regime legitimacy. In Nicaragua, this was the December 23 earthquake, which killed roughly 6,000 people, left 250,000 homeless and destroyed much of Managua. Anastasio Somoza Debayle – the first Somoza’s younger son and President since 1968 – and the National Guard pilfered reconstruction funds and foreign aid, simultaneously failing to restore order in the wake of the earthquake. They left little money for reconstruction and enraged every social class against the Somozas. By contrast, the turning point in El Salvador was the 1972 election, with the regime-backed candidate


\(^7\) J.M. Paige, ‘Coffee and Power in El Salvador’ in Latin American Research Review vol. 28, 1993, pp. 7-12; Armstrong, 1980, pp. 3-4
fraudulently defeating José Napoleon Duarte, the moderate opposition mayor of San Salvador, despite a massive electoral victory for Duarte. Protests against the regime for this flagrant fraud were closely followed by severe repression, which convinced many in the opposition that peaceful change achieved by working through the system was impossible.\(^8\)

It was in this crisis of state legitimacy that the Catholic Church’s leadership emerged as an opposition force. While some radical parish priests and lay leaders became directly involved in the growing guerrilla movements from an early stage, the Church hierarchy was generally cautious. Both Archbishops Chávez and Obando called publicly for respect for human rights and human dignity, supporting democratic reforms, the freeing of political prisoners, and a political opening to a moderate opposition, while denouncing the violent action of guerrillas and government repression alike. In Nicaragua, Church criticism of the Somoza regime was demonstrated through pastoral letters and church media as well as frequent public refusals by Obando and other high-ranking church officials to participate in legitimating the regime. For example, upon being made Archbishop, Obando sold the Mercedes gifted to him by Somoza and donated the proceeds to the poor. In El Salvador most bishops were deeply conservative, but a succession of archbishops – beginning with Chávez, escalating with Óscar Romero and continuing to a limited extent with Arturo Rivera y Damas – supported moderate opposition to the regime through sermons at weekly Mass, articles in Catholic publications, and frequent interviews on Catholic radio. This became increasingly radical over time, with Romero moving from support for reform and a halt in repression to explicit support for Church relations with the ‘popular organizations,’ to support for violent insurrection against a government that had lost all moral authority to rule.\(^9\)

These similar forms of moderate opposition were met with drastically different responses. In Nicaragua, the Church, particularly the establishment, saw relatively limited repression. While the National Guard destroyed the commune on the island of Solentiname led by Ernesto Cardenal in 1977, other radical groups such as the CEBs of San Pablo Apóstol and Barrio Riguero outside Managua, or the missionary work of the Capuchin Order on the Atlantic coast, saw little persecution. The Managua CEBs, despite their existence as incubators of revolutionary thought and action, or the Capuchin missionaries’ reporting of National Guard atrocities against peasant organizers, were allowed to continue their work unaccosted. Still, by 1978, the Church was the target of increasing harassment, with even Archbishop Obando y Bravo ominously designated by Somoza as ‘Commandante Miguel’. This rarely went beyond intimidation and harassment though. While Nicaraguan troops launched violent attacks on churches during assaults on already rebellious communities, these atrocities represented incidental violence as opposed to a campaign directly targeting the Church. While this repression was still significant, it did not affect the Church’s ability to function, nor its increasingly defiant stance as an opposition force. With increasingly direct calls from the Church hierarchy for the fall of Somoza and his replacement with a democratic government, as well as heavy involvement by the Iglesia Popular in armed resistance to the regime, three priests had been killed by February 1979. Yet, two of these priests had taken up arms against Somoza. Even when the Church finally broke with Somoza completely and endorsed an armed revolution on 2 June 1979, the National Guard did not accost the Church hierarchy in any significant way.\(^10\)

By contrast, violence in El Salvador was perpetrated to a level and extent that far exceeded Nicaraguan repression. In El Salvador, repression began as soon as Church involvement in the opposition was clear. In


\(^9\) Kirk, 1992, p. 90; Montgomery, 1980, pp. 76-85

\(^10\) Kirk, 1992, pp. 65-82, 94-9
1970, following his participation in El Salvador’s first conference on agrarian reform, Father José Inocencio Alas was kidnapped, tortured, and left on the roadside by security forces. Only the personal intervention of Monseñor Arturo Rivera y Damas saved his life. In 1972, another priest was kidnapped and brutally murdered following his involvement in the formation of a CEB in Chalatenango, the epicenter of La Matanza. Expulsions, beatings and periodic murders of priests were common occurrences throughout the 1970’s, such as Father Rutilio Grande in 1977, despite their explicit role as non-partisan community leaders. Lay leaders experienced even harsher repression, with hundreds being arrested and murdered. This only radicalized the Church’s base, including organizations such the Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS), some of whose members began to join guerrilla organizations to fight the regime. Repression duly increased, with the White Warriors’ Union, a right-wing death squad, distributing flyers reading ‘Be a Patriot! Kill A Priest’ shortly after their murder of Jesuit Father Alfonso Navarro Oveido in July 1977. However, the worst was yet to come. On 24 March 1980, Archbishop Romero was murdered by paramilitaries under the orders of Roberto D’Aubuisson, soon-to-be founder of the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) party. Romero’s successor as Archbishop preached dialogue, but the civil war had already begun in earnest, with severe repression by the government and mass involvement by the Church’s radicalized base in guerrilla organizations. State terror even affected Western missionaries, including a group of four American nuns, who were raped and killed by Salvadoran National Guard troopers. Some of these women had previously worked in Somoza’s Nicaragua without being harmed. The Church establishment, supportive of a moderate opposition, was left with little power.11

The reasons for this difference in repression is related in part to the structure and ideology (or lack thereof) of each regime. In Nicaragua, the ‘autonomous personalist state’ used a lower (although still significant) level of repression against the Church for a number of reasons related to its structure. First, the regime, by being centered on maintaining the Somozas and their cronies in power, required allies among the fractured Nicaraguan elite. The Somozas and their clique lacked a basis for their rule beyond their ability to provide patronage to various elite actors. Most of this elite, including the Church, eventually embraced the opposition as misrule and corruption under Anastasio Somoza Debayle became increasingly blatant and concentrated, no longer benefitting the business elite or the Church.

Yet, the Church had been a longstanding and loyal ally to the Somozas, along with the business community and the old political elite in the Conservative and Liberal parties. In this sense, it is understandable that the Somozas would be unwilling to alienate a longstanding ally through repression, even if the ally exhibited some resistance to the regime. The Church would be especially harmful to repress, due to its status as an institution. While individual members of the business and political elite could be persecuted without threatening the whole elite class, the hierarchical nature of the Church meant that persecution of members of the Church would potentially be treated by the Church as an attack on the entire institution.

Furthermore, even as an opposition force, the Catholic Church was often useful to Somoza. Archbishop Obando acted a number of times as a mediator between the guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the regime, such as in December 1974 during a hostage crisis. The Nicaraguan regime may have been able to repress the Church, but ideology was certainly not a motivating factor in repression as it was in El Salvador. In fact, with the Nicaraguan regime’s power so concentrated in the hands of a single man, the lack of persecution of the Church could be explained simply by Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s personal idiosyncrasies or even his

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fear of damnation over any ideological concerns.\textsuperscript{12}

Structurally, the Salvadoran regime had advantages over the Nicaraguan regime in being able to repress the Church. The state in El Salvador, more institutionalized and less reliant on the legitimacy and leadership of a single man than Nicaragua, was a ‘non-hegemonic instrumentalist state’ dominated and controlled by an alliance of the Army and economic elite. The elite, while it saw periodic internal conflict between reformists and reactionaries, was broadly unified along class lines. There was near-consensus among the ruling elite on the necessity of retaining power without real input from the majority of the population or other social institutions. With the support of a narrow but cohesive segment of the population, the regime was able to implement repressive measures against the Church, comfortable in the belief that it did not need the support of the Church to legitimize its rule or maintain power.

Further, elite ideology in El Salvador had an important role. From the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and continuing through until the civil war, El Salvador’s elite rejected the Catholic Church’s influence, seeing it as hostile to what they defined as ‘progress’: a growing economy based on freewheeling, Darwinian capitalism. This is seen both in their policies, removing the Church’s traditional privileges and social roles in education and family life, as well as their attitudes. One of the only direct studies of the political attitudes of the Salvadoran elite shows that Members of this elite [view] themselves as the heirs of cosmopolitan entrepreneurs who taught the country how to compete, raised the general standard of living, and made possible an industrial future for El Salvador.\textsuperscript{13}

With this self-image, the elite saw impediments to their mission, namely a Church concerned with the poor: at best backwards and worthy of contempt, and at worst a sign of Communist subversion. The carnage of \textit{La Matanza} was justified as a means of restoring social order to guarantee continued development. Therefore, as the Church was seen as a threat to social order, it would logically become a target of repression. This was inevitable in a system that facilitated the expression of radically reactionary ideological violence from groups like the White Warriors’ Union. Thus, regime structure and ideology were key factors in the varying levels of repression experienced by the Catholic Church as an opposition force during this period of upheaval in Nicaragua and El Salvador.\textsuperscript{14}

In Nicaragua and El Salvador, the regimes in power faced similar forms of resistance of their Catholic Church establishments, but reacted differently. In Nicaragua, the regime repressed political dissent but left the Church largely untouched until, like the rest of the country, it turned irrevocably away from the Somoza dynasty. In El Salvador, the regime reacted to Church opposition with immediate and brutal repression. The reasons for these disparities can be explained by differences between regime ideology and structure on one hand, and the nature of the popular uprisings on the other. While the Nicaraguan state was non-ideological and centered entirely on the Somozas and their clique, the Salvadoran state’s structure was instrumentalized to empower the landowning elite and their allies in the military, who followed an ideology of ‘progress’ and economic development at all costs.

The differing repression of the Church in the two countries has influenced its political position in the post-conflict period. In Nicaragua, following the victory of the FSLN, the Church’s relationship with the new regime quickly soured. Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo became one of the most vocal sources of opposition to the new government, and the Church emerged as an independent and powerful political actor. This has continued to this day, with conflict between Sandinista President Daniel Ortega and the Church over his use of Christianity as a political prop. By contrast, in El Salvador, the Church retreated in the face of the state’s mounting repression.


\textsuperscript{13} Paige, 1980, p. 17

\textsuperscript{14} Lernoux, 1982, p. 68; Armstrong, 1980, pp. 5-7
Under the leadership of Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas, the Church denounced violence on both sides and decried the rebels’ unwillingness to engage in peace talks while the country burned and hundreds of thousands of people were killed and displaced, mostly by government forces. Today, Archbishop José Luis Escobar Alas, a conservative, leads the Salvadoran Church. He recently and abruptly closed *Tutela Legal*, the famed Church human rights office vital in recording human rights abuses during the civil war, claiming that it is no longer necessary. It would appear that deep differences continue to exist between the Church’s role in relation to the state in both El Salvador and Nicaragua.

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Enemies of Rationality, Mirrors of Intent? The Role of Images in International Relations, Part I
Alexandra Gallovicova

This piece is the first of a two-part series. Part II will apply the ideas developed here to a case study: British and French perceptions of Germany regarding intervention in Libya. This will be published in Issue 4.

‘For the most part we do not first see, and then define; we define first and then see.’
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, 1922, p.81

Decision-making in international politics is not done at random; it is influenced by the environment it is made in, the circumstances leading up to the problem, the actors’ individual preferences and a great deal of other relevant factors. These situational characteristics exist in relation to one another, creating impressions of the problem, the other actors, oneself and possible solutions. The resulting constructs are known as images, and they are omnipresent in the world as we see it. Images affect how we view every actor, situation and decision in the world, and thus form an integral part of our decision-making. The same is true for decision-making in international politics.

Political psychology and image theory receive little attention in mainstream IR analysis, an oversight due to the fact that many of the classical IR theories base their core assumptions on the behaviour of actors in the international system. Broadly speaking realism, for instance, assumes all states behave in their own self-interest; whilst liberalism believes that basic human nature is good. However, these assumptions did not spring out of nowhere – they are based on observing human and state interaction and the consequent formation of impressions or images. In case this behaviour deviates from what the observer has come to expect from the actor, this new information can become a stimulus for image adjustment and entirely change the relationship between the observer and the observed – for instance, the U.S.-Russian relationship in the wake of the Crimean crisis. Unlike what classical IR theories assume, images are not static, and the same is true with international relations. The study of images in IR is thus important because image theory recognises the dynamic nature of the international system, which cannot be described fully in the rather simplistic terms of classical IR theories. The importance of images in IR also provides validity to constructivism as an IR theory – they are created through social interactions between actors and are ultimately joint products of the perceiver and the perceived object’s characteristics.

This article seeks to outline the importance of images in international relations. I will strive to answer three questions: where images and perceptions come from, how they affect international relations and how they change. Ultimately, I will argue that it is worthwhile to study images in IR in order to better understand the motivations of individual actors and possibly predict the outcomes of ongoing conflicts.

1.1 What are images in IR?
An image is an inferred construct. Boulding defines it as ‘the total cognitive, affective and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe’1 An image is thus the organised representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system – ‘organised’ in the sense that images are not simply inventories of past impressions, but attempts to create a unified system composed of various impressions of objects and appropriate responses to them.2 Images can range from unsophisticated stereotypes to highly nuanced multi-element structures, but

1 Quoted in Herrmann, R. K., and Fischerkeller, M. P., ‘Beyond the enemy image and spiral model: cognitive–strategic research after the cold war’. International Organization, 49(03), 1995, pp. 415-45
their core consists of cognitions and ideas regarding the sum of attributes an actor associates with a certain object – hence, the object’s perceived character.

Images exist in and influence only the ‘psychological milieu’ (the world as the actor sees it) not the ‘operational milieu’ (the world in which policy is carried out) of the actor. Thus, in image theory, the decision-making process is affected first and foremost by the actor’s own agency, as decisions are mediated by the actor’s goals, calculations and perceptions. According to image theory, individuals act to provide meaning to their environment. They do so through building mental representations of the world – images – in order to simplify their interpretation of their surroundings and make this representation stable and coherent. Finally, image theory assumes that perception and interpretation is inseparable. This represents a short but accurate description of the image-alteration and image-affirmation processes.

In terms of what images of any given object contain, Kelman outlines three key components, which place the respective images on three axes that then define the image in the eyes of the perceiver: strength-weakness, friendship-hostility and threat-opportunity. ‘Cognitive attributes’, which are viewed by the perceiver as ‘inherent’ characteristics of the actor, independent of their own response to them, are the primary component. They affect the actor’s placement on the strength-weakness perceptual axis and thus the object’s capabilities, as well as its perceived intent. The cognitive attributes of an actor stem from a pre-existing pattern of association, or the historical experience of the observer with the observed. Hence, the cognitive attributes are not simply a reaction to a single specific situation. Secondly, the ‘affective component’ encompasses the perceiver’s levels of approval for and liking of the observed actor, defining its positions on the friendship-hostility axis. The last is the ‘action component’, containing a set of responses to the actor deemed appropriate in light of its perceived attributes and placement on the threat-opportunity axis. In deciding the placements of an actor on each of the three axes, an image is created and categorised.

1.2 Types of images

However, as we are arguing for the significance of images in IR, we are attempting to attribute images to states. The problem with this is twofold: not only are images and corresponding perceptions of intergroup relations held by individuals within a given society – which, given that we are operating under the banner of constructivism, are not our primary actors in IR - but each individual in that society has their own distinct images. Even with oversimplification, we can end up with a minimum of two representative images – that of the decision-making elite and the general public. However, their connectedness in the creation and stabilisation of the state’s power structure allows us to assume Wendt’s standpoint for the purpose of this study - that ‘states share collective identities which structure anarchy’. Their accumulated historical experience, political culture and geopolitics shape enduring perspectives, attitudes and beliefs, within which policy predispositions emerge. The sum of these perspectives and predispositions forms the national identity – the sum of the national self-image and the images of all other actors in international relations – through which all information is interpreted. The process also works in reverse;

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3 Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995, p.444
5 Image-formation or image-alteration.
8 I.e. the observed actor’s perceived power.
12 Vertzberger, Y., *The World in Their Minds:*
through a process of socialisation into a culture, the individual is exposed to specific images: the national self-image, images of the ‘other’, images of specific nations, and images of an inter-societal order. Each separate culture includes a cognitive map of other groups and traits, which it transmits to its members through education as well as expressions of culture to which they are exposed, such as art. Acquiring inter-societal images is a key part of the process of socialization into a society with a particular social structure. An individual can and does acquire this common culture; hence, it can be claimed that a state has its own identity – a set of images of itself and other actors. This article therefore argues that the nation-state can be viewed as a sufficiently coherent entity that it is meaningful to treat it as an agent and that it is somehow distinct from other nation-states, with different interests, purposes, preferences, etc.

The first image forming the state’s identity is the national self-image; an amalgam of guiding beliefs, values, ethics and morals of the state. All together, they can be referred to as principles. These aspects of the self-image govern the choice of goals and actions taken to pursue them. The article will now look into the two aspects most significant to our case study – beliefs and values – as Vertzberger defines them.

Beliefs are primarily evidence-based scripts, involving principles and general ideas on the nature and physical environment that constitute the policy-maker’s field of action. Their subset of operational code beliefs plays a major role in political information processing, allowing beliefs to deal with the most basic images about the nature of the political world. The operational code is formed by two clusters. The first contains information about the essence of the political world and political actors, particularly philosophical beliefs about the essentials of politics, the nature of the political universe and of political conflict, instrumental beliefs on the best possible approach and the fundamental character of allies and enemies. The second deals with the controllability and predictability of historical-political developments. Its main importance lies with understanding risk calculation and coping with odds.

The diagnostic and prescriptive framework of beliefs is important in highly uncertain situations, novel situations with scarce, contradictory, unreliable or abundant information. The importance attached to information is largely determined by its placement on the belief-disbelief continuum. Just as with images and perceptions, the validity and centrality of a belief, as measured by the dependence of other beliefs on it, influences its degree of resistance to change, particularly if some or all other beliefs in a given subset need to change as well. Furthermore, when the beliefs of two actors match, they tend to view one another as closer than they are.

Values are the second relevant factor in national self-image formation. These normative scripts form the key to expectations about norm-based behaviour. They determine what is desirable, as evidenced by the increased sensitivity to stimuli compatible with one’s values at the expense of attention to other stimuli. In turn, negatively viewed objects tend to be evaluated negatively as a matter of course. It is also easier for a state to view the behaviour of others through the perspective of its own culture rather than adopting a different perspective – hence, imposing the observing state’s values and beliefs as the correct ones, and viewing deviations from that as wrong or of lesser value. Hence, the state tends to have a limited degree of empathy for other states.

Images form the cultural core of the state, which is concerned not only with the current

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Kelman, 1965, p. 43

It possesses an internal identity.

It possesses an external identity.

Berenekoetter, 2012, p. 5

Vertzberger, 1990, pp. 286-292


Vertzberger, 1990, pp. 114-151

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Vertzberger, 1990, pp. 114-151
state of images and the relationships between them, but also what they should look like. However, the self-image alone cannot represent an actor’s identity, which Jepperson defines as ‘mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other’. The self-image provides a frame of reference from which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their relationships with other states. The national self-image is thus one of the foundations of an ‘imagined community’ – it forms the basis of beliefs and values which individuals associate with the community to which they perceive themselves as belonging, thus creating the foundation for a feeling of citizenship and nationality, which are further social constructs. This national self-image – and thus nationality – is defined against the ‘other’, to the point where Alexander, Levin and Henry insist that an image cannot exist alone, but stems from the ‘perceived relationships between nations and serve to justify a nation's desired reaction or treatment toward another nation’; hence, no state can have an identity without both an image of itself and of the ‘other’. Hopf adds that state identities are rooted in sociocultural milieus, which produce understanding of the other based on differences in identity and practice. Images are thus the key to interpreting the action of ‘the other’.

Images of the other are not only created by the actor’s own interests and values, but also its historical experience with the other. This allows for an assessment of the motivation, capability and decision process attributed to the observed country. Through this systemisation process, the perceiver determines if the other’s goals are competitive or co-operative, to what degree it supports the perceiver’s goals and what relative power it possesses – its placement on the strength-weakness, friendship-hostility and threat-opportunity perceptual axes. Hence, images are used as judgemental heuristics in interpreting the behaviour of other actors, despite the availability of other judgement-relevant information. This streamlines the decision-making process, but also opens it up to the possibility of error and misperception. Should an image of the other prove quite simplistic and absolutistic, it becomes difficult to disconfirm and a threat to perceptual accuracy. Oversimplifying or disregarding images in international relations can therefore lead to long-term misperceptions and mistakes in decision-making.

According to Kelman, there are three broad classes of images of another nation: images of its basic characteristics, predictions about its future behaviour and conceptions of appropriate ways of dealing with it. Though there are several distinctive sets of ideal types of images in IR, we find Martha Cottam’s typology as the most accurate and detailed way of categorising possible images. Her typology expands on the work of Richard Cottam and Herrmann, who identify four respective images: enemy, ally, colony and degenerate. But this typology ultimately cannot display the significance of events in modern IR, as the categories remain too general and simplistic to account for minor changes in the international system. Martha Cottam’s typology more fully captures the placement of images on all three axes - strength-weakness, friendship-hostility and threat-opportunity - distinguishing between seven types of images:

1. **enemy** (strong-hostile-threat)
2. **hegemonist** (strong-hostile-threat)
3. **dependent ally of the enemy** (weak-hostile-threat and/or opportunity)
4. **neutral** (neither-neither-threat and/or opportunity)

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21 Vertzberger, 1990, p. 268
22 cited in Berenskoetter, F., 2012, p. 3
25 Alexander, Levin and Henry, 2005, p.28
28 Herrmann et al, 1997, p. 10
29 Vertzberger, 1990, p. 126
30 Vertzberger, 1990, p. 151
31 Kelman, 1965, p. 394
32 Herrmann et al, 1997, p. 411
33 A state seen as representing a great opportunity to exploit and that is similar in capability but suffering from cultural decay.
34 Schafer, 1997, p. 815
5. ally\textsuperscript{35} (strong-friendly-opportunity)
6. dependent ally of the perceiver’s state (weak-friendly-opportunity)
7. puppet of the perceiver’s state\textsuperscript{36} (weak-friendly-opportunity)

Through this detailed typology, we can categorise and chart the progress of relations in IR with relative precision and make basic assumptions about the future of those relations. However, we must remember that the image applies to a specific point in time.

1.3 Perceptions and Image Change
Berenkoetter\textsuperscript{37} notes that ‘identities require constant affirmation and can be only temporarily stabilized – what one “is” (or wants to be) is sustained by what one “does.”’ Images are not static constructs; they are reaffirmed or contradicted by perception. Internal messages about image stability form a part of the images; however, their core stems from inputs and outputs of information. Images can thus be modified by situational variables\textsuperscript{38} and are highly context-dependent, reinforcing their place in constructivist theory.

Perception is an integrative process by which stimuli become interpreted by the actor by integrating the stimulus events with the previous images the actor (in our case, the state) had held. It is through perception that a state assigns a cause to an event, defines constraints, states goals, and enables the creation and evaluation of solutions.\textsuperscript{39} Not all acts, occurrences or messages in IR reach the level of stimulus, meaning that they do not always penetrate the cognitive system of a given actor. Four questions must be answered before an event can be considered a stimulus, in the described order: Is the event truly informative? Is it relevant to our problems? Is it important?

Which of a set of possible alternative interpretations is the correct one?\textsuperscript{40} If all of these can be answered positively or relevantly, an actor will create cognitive representations of the environment in which foreign policy decisions occur – new situational images – and adjust the previously held ones. Perceptions are also concerned with the probability or a particular circumstance arising and changing in response to experience, either by reinforcing confidence or adjusting the previously held image.\textsuperscript{41}

1.4 Perception Creation
Perception is created in three interrelated stages. The first is the information-gathering phase, which also includes interpreting this information in order to create an accurate and sophisticated understanding of the social, political and physical milieu in terms of the issues faced and the environmental constraints placed on the range of available responses. Due to the fact that decision-makers generally prefer shallow, oversimplified and tendentious knowledge that nonetheless ‘gives them an unwarranted sense of confidence in their judgment’\textsuperscript{42} when observing other states, the possibility of error in their judgement begins in the very first phase.

Secondly, the actor derives and evaluates alternative courses of action, usually using a comparative cost-benefit analysis, and selects one. This is where the possibility of error is the strongest, be it contextual, transformational, epistemological or subconscious.\textsuperscript{43} These errors determine the level of differences between the subjective and objective reality and thus affect the accuracy of the image.\textsuperscript{44}

Finally, the actor implements its preferred response or chooses to implement it when domestic or external constraints allow it to do so. Misjudgements are likely to carry over, but do not always result in the same negative outcomes due to a possible discontinuity.
between phases. Ultimately, perception is the continuous process of adding new aspects to pre-existing images and can thus have a profound effect on them.

1.5 Why images matter

Images serve to predict the behaviour of actors by outlining how they view others and interpret their behaviour. Brewer et al note that images ‘include unique, detailed clusters of cognitive schema, and impact information processing and policy preferences in a variety of intergroup settings’. For instance, in a conflict situation, differences in images can produce a wide variety of responses and behaviours. Secondly, image theory argues that factors at the individual level of analysis do affect foreign policy decision-making and that those factors are subject to biases associated with psychological phenomena – or misperceived images. Thirdly, as Jervis and Vertzberger observe, ‘actors seek strong justification for their behaviour’ and ‘use images [to] define a situation, circumscribe roles to particular actors, determine their strategy by recognising the problem and formulating a response and justify the strategy implemented by acquiring accountability and legitimacy’. Image theory work on the international level thus indicates a clear connection between the image of another nation and one’s strategic policy choices vis-à-vis that nation.

Images can also potentially predict structural changes in IR. Richard Cottam was the first to create the concept of a ‘perceptual milieu’, stating that individuals ‘behave in perceptually patterned ways’, allowing for predictability in IR. He developed the ‘perceptual inferential scheme’, which showed that individuals are likely to follow certain common patterns when making decisions about international relations. According to Richard Cottam and Herrmann, ‘images form as a consequence of strategic relationships between nations and serve a functional purpose’. Kelman adds that ‘the term image can be useful in conceptualizing political ideology in a way that bridges the system level and the individual level, since comparable dimensions can be used to describe both the definition that is communicated and the image that is adopted. The study of the mutual images of two nations can allow for the development of a common set of dimensions, not only to compare A and B, but to compare the way in which each nation tries to present itself and how it is perceived’. Images can therefore serve as a unique connecting point between agency and structure analysis. They can be used in an explanatory or predictive fashion at both levels, as consistent images of other groups directly lead to the adoption of response strategies tailored to fit those images.

1.6 Limitations of images in IR

We have already observed that images are rife with error possibilities. Firstly, the intensity of feelings involved in creating and evaluating images can lead to distortions and misperceptions in the images. However, this fault can theoretically be overcome by viewing the image from a cognitive perspective. The second problem of perceptual self-insertion is more severe. Actors ignore their national self-image and images of the ‘other’ in periods when they believe everyone shares the same principles, the same priorities and therefore the same response system to outside stimuli. Their decision-makers assume that another’s behaviour can be predicted by self-insertion into their situation, as if the other state shared the perceiver’s cultural core. This is often a cause of misjudgements and resulting image-alteration in IR. Thirdly, should decision-makers avoid the aforementioned error and feel the need for more detailed images of the other, their capacity to get others to accept the desired image is low. Decision-maker mistakes are only one form of limitations. Images are also constrained by their own lack of a detailed definition and the nature of IR, in which they are one of many elements influencing behavioural predictions.

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45 Vertzberger, 1990, p. 9
46 Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; Herrmann et al., 1997
47 Schafer, 1997, p. 820
48 Vertzberger, 1990, pp. 298-307
49 Jervis, 1976, p. 382
50 Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995; quoted in Herman et al., 1997, p. 29
52 Kelman, 1965, p. 26
54 Herrmann et al., 1997, p. 408
55 Jervis, 1989, pp. 11-13
Images possess a clear significance in an attempt to predict and understand decision-making in IR. However, they are limited by the possibility of decision-maker error, their imprecise definition and unheard voice. The logic of how images influence policy choice must also be defined more closely and the empirical strength thereof must be tested. Ultimately, despite the significant role of images in guiding actors’ actions in IR, these constructs can only give us an approximation of the situation. Image theory on its own remains a significant aspect or political psychology, but one that needs to be incorporated into a wider analysis of communications and interpretation.

2. Conclusion

The objective of this article was to demonstrate that images in international relations matter and can have a major effect on policy-making in international organisations.

Images in IR are evolving inferred constructs, based on past experience but with the possibility for dramatic change if they encounter a sufficiently intrusive stimulus. They are organised representations of patterns attributed to the actor itself and other actors in the international system, against which the actor explicitly defines its identity. They contain three aspects: a cognitive, affective and an action component, which measure respectively the independently ‘inherent’ characteristics of the perceived object, its place on the strength-weakness, friendship-hostility and threat-opportunity axes and a set of appropriate responses to the object. Hence, images can be useful in predicting behaviour and justifying strategy by providing decisions with accountability and legitimacy.

The national self-image is the first image every actor in the international system acquires, and it encompasses the sum of the actor’s principles, through which it views the world around it. The state also creates images of other actors in the international system, which are not necessarily accurate representations of ‘the other’. Images are defined through the historical experience, beliefs and values of the perceiver, but also through the perception of recent events. They are thus coloured by emotion and often ignored or simplified, but always present in the background of IR. It is through perception and interpretation of events that new experiences are integrated into the previously existing images if an event qualifies as a stimulus for perceptual change.

Images can have a predictive function in IR analysis, as they can give us an approximation of future actor behaviour based on the past and current relationship between the observer and the observed. However, they can also be derailed by sudden developments in IR, meaning that they cannot be relied on as a completely accurate means of forecasting. For individual actors, images influence their decisions and allow them to justify their strategies vis-à-vis a certain actor. Hence, images can both influence and display to an observer the development of actors and the international system. However, we must remember that images are emotive, not objective constructs, and can not only lead the actors making decisions to make mistakes, but also the academic observer, who has their own images when attempting to forecast developments in the international system. Despite our inability to escape them – or perhaps because of it – images in IR are a valuable tool for policy analysis that deserve further study, particularly due to the subjective nature of decision-making in international politics. This will be further explored in the second part of the article, which will outline the practical effects of images on inter-state relations in international relations. The case study of changing French and British perceptions of Germany after the latter’s abstention in the UNSC vote on establishing a no-fly zone in Libya during the 2011 Libyan Civil War will outline both the helpful nature of images in predicting behaviours of other actors (the British case study) as well as how a single event can have great impact on a particular image and on inter-state relations (the French case study).
The Importance of Being a Propagandist: Yugoslavia and Ukraine
Thomas Colley

Propaganda has long been rejected by communications practitioners in the West as nefarious, deceitful, dishonest and manipulative.\footnote{N. Bolt, The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries, London: Hurst and Co., 2012; S. Tatham, Strategic Communication: A Primer, Advanced Research and Assessment Group Special Series 08/28, UK Defence Academy, 2008.} The preferred term in recent years has been ‘strategic communications’, which attempts to present what still amounts to persuasion in a more positive and transparent light.\footnote{Communication efforts in the West have been variously called information operations, public diplomacy, public affairs, psy-ops, influence operations in recent years, to name but a few. Even strategic communication has since been discredited. See S. Tatham, U.S. Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: Discredited Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College Press, 2013.} Advocating the need to be ‘first with the truth’ and to operate pro-actively in the modern networked media environment, strategic communicators have designated ‘propaganda’ outdated and immoral, the toolkit of Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini and Milosevic rather than contemporary liberal democracies. Debate continues over the similarities between the two concepts. Philip Taylor’s popular definition of propaganda, ‘the deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way’ for political purposes, implies similarity; the aim being to persuade people to behave in the way you want them to.\footnote{P. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day, Manchester University Press, 2003, p.6.} Either way, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that propaganda and censorship, dismissed by Western strategic communicators as ‘doomed to fail’,\footnote{Tatham, 2008, p.6.} is still influential in contemporary conflict.

From a communications perspective, the crisis in Ukraine has been particularly notable for the re-emergence of forms of propaganda that might be considered archaic in today’s networked world. Misinformation and censorship have been employed at an intensity not seen for decades within Europe. Social media is considered the future of mass communication based on events such as the Arab Spring. In Ukraine, however, while all sides have used social media, television has arguably been the dominant medium for information warfare; even leaflets have generated international outrage.\footnote{Russian TV swamps airwaves in Crimea propaganda war’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10695038/Russian-TV-swamps-airwaves-in-Crimea-propaganda-war.html, 26 April 2014; ‘Ukraine Jews Told To ‘Register’ In Mystery Flyer’, http://news.sky.com/story/1245087/ukraine-jews-told-to-register-in-mystery-flyer, 26 April 2014.} In the informational realm, the West has so far demonstrated limited capability to respond to mass propaganda methods it has long rejected. Meanwhile the new Ukrainian government under Oleksandr Turchynov has been mercilessly portrayed in a pro-Russian multimedia propaganda barrage as a ‘fascist junta’, bent on subjugating ethnic Russians at the behest of the US and Europe.\footnote{T. Judah, ‘Ukraine: The Phony War?’, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/2/ukraine-phony-war/?insrc=hpss, 26 April 2014.}

Uncertain of the future, strategists in such situations have little choice but to look to the past as a source of guidance. Of all comparisons that could be made with Ukraine, the situation is arguably most similar to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.\footnote{ibid.} Both conflicts began with the emergence of nationalist governments, attempts to legislate against minorities, reactionary protest, territorial annexation, declaration of autonomous regions, unofficial referenda in which ethnic minorities have
refused to participate, as well as sporadic armed confrontations. In both cases actions were justified based on putative threats of annihilation by other ethnic groups and ultranationalist elements. In spite of two decades of development in which the media environment has changed beyond all recognition, the methods used to spread propaganda have been remarkably similar as well.

The main purpose of this article is to evaluate the significance of propaganda in the Yugoslav wars. In doing so, certain comparisons will be made with Ukraine today. These comparisons are to some extent limited, since the situation in Ukraine has not, and hopefully will not, degenerate into civil war. Nonetheless, re-examining the Yugoslav wars will hopefully enable some tentative conclusions to be drawn about Ukraine, as well as the significance of propaganda to contemporary conflict more generally.

The Yugoslav Wars

There are many facets of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession about which analysts disagree. Academics debate anything from when they started, who is to blame, how many wars there were and how they should be defined. Few events in recent history have provoked such vehement debate. However, one point on which many authors agree is that propaganda was one of the most important weapons of war that destroyed the former Yugoslavia.

Propaganda does not fire weapons, rape women or execute people. Nonetheless it was a central feature of the Yugoslav wars. It was the means by which competing sides mobilised nationalist sentiment, constructing false histories to justify expansionist or secessionist claims. Propaganda was also central to the strategies of the belligerents. Croatia and Bosnia adopted a victim strategy, subordinating military strength to portray themselves as helpless victims of Serb aggression to foster international support. Slovenia based their strategy on generating images of their tenacious stand against the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in order to legitimise their independence. Serbian domestic propaganda was extremely effective in mustering domestic public support for war. Yet Serbia’s attempts to either play the victim, or legitimise their actions internationally, failed due to their brutality at places such as Trnopolje, Markale, Srebrenica and Racak. Ultimately it was these Serb actions, rather than propaganda per se, that were decisive in precipitating the external interventions that ended the Yugoslav wars.

Given the plethora of debates on both propaganda and the Yugoslav wars, a number of clarifications must first be made. The Yugoslav Wars of Succession, or ‘Yugoslav wars’, refer here to the wars between 1991 and 1999 that occurred due to the collapse of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Many authors treat the Yugoslav Wars of Succession as a single war. However, the various stages of war in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo will primarily be referred to separately, in order to tease out the unique role of propaganda in each.

Additionally, analysis of propaganda in the Yugoslav wars is made uniquely challenging by the extent to which many academics from the former Yugoslavia have obfuscated debates about the conflict through nationalist bias. An historical example of this is the reporting of the number of deaths at the Ustashe-run Jasenovac concentration camp in the Second World War. Depending on whether Croatian or Serbian historical accounts are consulted, the supposed number of Serbs killed by Croats varies

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13 Gow & Tilsley, 1996.
between 50,000 and 700,000.\textsuperscript{15} It is difficult to draw valid conclusions from academic research when the research itself is inherently propagandistic. Nonetheless, the extent to which propaganda has permeated academia is in itself indicative of its significance to the Yugoslav wars.

Communist propaganda was instrumental in the unification of Yugoslavia after the Second World War, just as nationalist propaganda was influential in the state’s destruction after the Cold War. After the Second World War, which saw vicious internecine conflict in Yugoslavia in which hundreds of thousands were killed, Tito successfully constructed a collective identity of Yugoslavism, by which people coexisted relatively peacefully under the propagandistic slogan of ‘brotherhood and unity’. However, Tito’s demise in 1980 was followed by a decade of economic decline, rampant hyperinflation and mass unemployment. Combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this created a febrile situation in which political elites, under external pressure to democratise, mobilised nationalist sentiment in order to consolidate their power and pursue secessionist or expansionist political agenda. Elite politicians, manipulating the mass media, called on people to reject Communist propaganda and embrace their previously suppressed Serbian, Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovar identities. This precipitated a security dilemma in which each side armed themselves against the perceived threat of anything from discrimination to genocide at the hands of their ‘brothers’.\textsuperscript{16} Thus whilst economic decline and external political pressure created the permissive conditions for the breakdown of the SFRY,\textsuperscript{17} propaganda was a key catalyst in making war thinkable in Yugoslavia, let alone inevitable.\textsuperscript{18}

The propaganda methods used to mobilise nationalist support were a fairly traditional combination of rhetoric, myth and symbolism. Essentially, each republic’s leaders propagated the same idea; that they were threatened with annihilation by the others. A ‘Manichean morality’ pervaded media coverage, whereby each side constructed false histories proclaiming their innocence and the evil of their opponents.\textsuperscript{19} Kosovar Albanians were accused of forcing out Serbs with a ‘physical, moral and psychological reign of terror’. Bosnians were portrayed as part of a dangerous Islamic conspiracy.\textsuperscript{21} Croatian propaganda conjured images of ‘Greater Serbia’, an evil, expansionary, annihilatory Other, seeking to invade, enslave, and exterminate the Croatian people.\textsuperscript{22} The Serbian media evoked the horrors of the fascist Croatian Ustashe during the Second World War as evidence of continued Croatian genocidal intent.\textsuperscript{23} The propagation of fear drove each party towards a war of ‘self-defence’ to protect their constructed identity group.\textsuperscript{24}

There are striking similarities with Ukraine, though the persuasiveness of such propaganda was enhanced by avoidable political mistakes. The vetoed attempt by Turchynov’s parliament to downgrade the status of the Russian language in February 2014 draws immediate parallels with new Croatian president Tudjman’s downgrading of the constitutional status of the Croatian Serbs in 1990.\textsuperscript{25} Both cases provided ammunition for opponents to claim the threat of cultural genocide, given the symbolic importance of language to ethnicity. At a time of growing tension, the Ukrainian parliament should have considered the threatening effect of such a decision on ethnic Russians, but also the propaganda opportunity it provided to elites such as Putin to manipulate

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} M. Brown, ed., \textit{The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict}, MIT Press, 1996.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Thompson, 1994, p.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} ibid., p.7
  \item \textsuperscript{21} D. MacDonald, 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} ibid., p.8
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Silber & Little, 1995.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Turchynov came to power after the former president, Victor Yanukovych fled on February 21\textsuperscript{\textdagger} 2014, in the wake of the ‘Maidan Revolution’, months of political protests against the Kiev government.
\end{itemize}
human behaviour as they experience it in society is almost impossible.\(^{31}\)

Indeed, existing data indicates that the effects of demagogic nationalist rhetoric in driving Yugoslavia towards war may have been exaggerated.\(^{32}\) In Croatia, Tudjman’s nationalist party only gained 42 per cent of the vote when it came to power in 1990, and less than 25 per cent of Serbs voted for their nationalist party.\(^{33}\) Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia never even achieved an electoral majority during his entire tenure.\(^{34}\) Furthermore, despite intense Serbian propaganda regarding the genocidal threat of the Croatian *Ustashe*, between fifty and eighty per cent of the Serbs called up to territorial defence units during the Yugoslav wars refused to serve.\(^{35}\) This suggests that far fewer people believed the ‘message’ than many have suggested.

This is unsurprising. It is too simplistic to assume that simply by referring to history and symbolism, dormant identities would be awakened and people would be inexorably compelled to fight.\(^{36}\) Much of the Yugoslav wars were fought in areas that had previously seen the greatest amounts of positive coexistence.\(^{37}\) The assumption that people would immediately rise up to defend against historical enemies is based on outdated hypodermic or ‘magic bullet’ theories of propaganda that assume a uniform response exists to a given stimulus.\(^{38}\)

Evidence of the propaganda effects once the wars began is equally inconclusive. During the Serbian shelling of Sarajevo in July 1992, a

\(^{26}\) See Kaplan, 1993.


\(^{29}\) Taylor, 2003.

survey of Serbs showed that 38 per cent wrongly believed that Muslims and Croats were responsible, indicating that Serb propaganda, led by the Serbian Radio-Television (RTS) ‘lying machine’, was extremely effective.\(^3\) Crediting this to propaganda is understandable, given that RTS was known to present blatantly false information, even claiming quite ridiculously that it was actually Muslim authorities who were holding Sarajevo under siege ‘from within’. Perhaps more illuminating was a survey in the same month that revealed that 44 per cent of Serbs stated that RTS kept them badly informed. This suggests that Serbian censorship was effective, but many Serbs were still sceptical about how the conflict was portrayed.\(^4\)

There is further evidence that the effectiveness of propaganda in popular mobilisation in both Yugoslavia and Ukraine has been overestimated. In Bosnia, Mueller claims that ethnic warfare, where entire communities fought against each other, neighbour against neighbour, did not occur.\(^5\) Most of the violence was actually driven by small groups of paramilitaries, while ordinary people were inextricably caught up in the bloodshed.\(^6\) This contradicts the notion that nations were propagandised en masse in a wave of nationalist hysteria that drove them towards internecine conflict. The parallels with Ukraine are again noteworthy, where the occupation of government buildings has been led by small numbers of pro-Russian separatists, while journalists report little involvement by the majority of the population.\(^7\)

**Propaganda and the Conduct of War**

At present, the situation in Ukraine resembles what Judah refers to as a ‘phony war’, characterised by sporadic confrontations rather than widespread conflict.\(^8\) This situation inflates the importance of propaganda, since most of the conflict is taking place in the global informational realm. Hopefully, a diplomatic resolution will be found to end the conflict, though at the time of writing this is highly uncertain. However, if the conflict does escalate, the Yugoslav wars demonstrate that propaganda will likely be as important to the conduct of war as to its initiation.

While the extent to which nationalist rhetoric permeated Yugoslav society is equivocal; that propaganda was central to the belligerents’ strategies is beyond doubt. From the outset of the military action in Slovenia, through Croatia, Bosnia and eventually Kosovo, domestic and international perceptions of the combatants were integral to each nation’s plans. The most powerful demonstration of the successful use of propaganda was Slovenia’s victory in their ten day war against the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).

In a meticulously planned media campaign, Slovenia presented a legitimate fight for political and economic freedom, whilst achieving total strategic surprise against the sparsely deployed and poorly informed JNA.\(^9\) By generating images of incidents such as JNA tanks crushing vehicle blockades and then swiftly making them available to the international press, Slovenians portrayed themselves fighting valiantly against illegitimate aggressors, even though the Slovenians probably fired first.\(^10\) Slovenia’s proactive portrayal of competence generated significant international support, which Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian victim-based propaganda found extremely difficult to obtain.

For Croatia and Bosnia, the ‘propaganda of the victim’ was central to their strategies. Initially for Croatia, generating an image of victimhood superseded military effectiveness.\(^11\) Croatia deliberately left besieged forces in Vukovar and Dubrovnik under-reinforced to generate images of suffering. The plan was to foster the ‘CNN Effect’, which would compel Western powers

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39 Thompson, 1994, p.viii; 127.
40 ibid., p.127.
42 ibid.
44 ibid.

45 Gow & Tilsley, 1996.
46 ibid.
to intervene to prevent further bloodshed. 48

Ironically, the staunch Croatian defence of Vukovar merely embarrassed President Tudjman, undermined his strategy and forced Croatia to take a stronger military stance thereafter. 49 His failure resulted from ignoring a fundamental rule of successful propaganda; in order to function effectively it must remain undetected.

Bosnia was a genuine victim of Serbian aggression, but its attempts to embellish its victimhood were largely ineffective, arguably generating deleterious effects. On several occasions, the Bosnian Army was identified by UNPROFOR peacekeepers as firing on its own people to generate more international support. 50 Such behaviour led UNPROFOR peacekeepers to conclude that all sides were equally at fault, 51 and was therefore counterproductive to the Bosnian cause. This cynical tactic reached such levels that the Bosnian forces were accused of the infamous Serb mortar attacks on Sarajevo’s Markale marketplace in 1994 and 1995. 52 Serbian authorities worked hard to promulgate the lie, replacing Muslim corpses with Serbian casualties from elsewhere in the city. 53 Yet the fact that Bosnians were even suspected demonstrates how ineffective their victim strategy had been. Arguably though, Western intervention to end the Bosnian war was precipitated by the genuine victims of the Serbs at places such as Srebrenica rather than Bosnia’s victim strategy per se.

In Kosovo, Serbia’s strategy again centred on propaganda, as Milosevic attempted to portray Serbia as a victim of NATO aggression, a sovereign state acting legitimately to crush a secessionist movement. 54 Rather than taking steps to avoid NATO air attack, Milosevic appeared to provoke it. 55 He hoped that the superiority of NATO air power would foster a ‘bullying effect’, which would reduce Western political will for continued intervention on the grounds that it was both disproportionate and legally questionable. 56 Images of NATO collateral damage could then confer victim status on the Serbs and discourage further intervention, especially a ground campaign. 57 Concomitantly, the disruption caused by NATO bombing could provide cover for the rapid ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population. 58

The generation of propaganda was the fulcrum about which the Serbian campaign pivoted, but propaganda was no less important to NATO. Western leaders presented the war as a struggle between the humanitarian forces of good and the Serbian forces of evil. 59 Parallels can be drawn with Western propaganda towards Ukraine, portrayed as torn between affiliation to the Nobel Peace Prize-winning European Union and the ‘Big Bad Bear’ of Putin’s Russia. 60 Invariably, such Manichean propaganda oversimplifies a complex geopolitical situation in which both the West and Russia accuse each other of encroachment in their respective spheres of influence. 61

Nonetheless, the Russian response in Ukraine demonstrates the disadvantage the West faces against an opponent willing to employ overt propaganda and censorship. Western commentators decried Russia’s decision to block transmission of Voice of America radio in Russia from April 2014. 62 Yet the refusal to

49 Gow, 2003.
51 Ibid.
53 Thompson, 1994.
56 Freedman, 2000, p.335.
61 Ibid.
engage in such practices disadvantages the West against an opponent who has no compunction about doing so.

In reality though, Western radio broadcasts, blocked or otherwise, are unlikely to have significant opinion effects within Russia or Ukraine. As the Yugoslav wars demonstrated, both Serbia and the West’s propaganda was effective on the domestic level but had very little impact on opposition public opinion. On Kosovo, many Serbs genuinely believed that Kosovar Albanians were fleeing NATO bombers rather than Serb paramilitaries. Yet few in the West were likely convinced by a crude RTS video of a Clinton speech with Hitler’s face superimposed.

64 Gocic, 2000.

The Importance of Images

Images are immensely powerful for propaganda purposes.68 While images are often unpredictable in the way they emerge and spread, and thus hard to control, they are often more powerful than conventional weapons in the battle for ‘hearts, minds and retinas’ that is contemporary war.69 The publication of images of Trnopolje concentration camp in Bosnia in 1992 appeared to lead to UN Resolution 770 which enforced humanitarian aid in Bosnia; coverage of the Markale marketplace massacre in 1994 was immediately followed by the NATO ultimatum that ended the city’s bombardment; and finally images of massacres, first at Srebrenica in Bosnia and later at Racak in Kosovo, directly precipitated decisive UN and NATO interventions to end the wars.70

In the Yugoslav wars, effective image control was demonstrated by the slick Slovenian propaganda machine. For example, international journalists were transported to a burnt out JNA Armoured Personnel Carrier, providing further evidence of Slovenia’s successes against the mighty JNA. The fact that it had been burnt out by local youths rather than the Slovenian army was omitted from the explanation to the press.71 Propaganda based on falsehood is often ineffective, especially when exposed. However, this deception worked since it reflected wider truths about the conflict; that ‘plucky little Slovenia’ was defending itself resolutely against one of Europe’s largest armies.72

Conversely, Croatia and Bosnia overestimated the effect of images of suffering in encouraging external military intervention. In 1994 the West received a plethora of images of the Rwandan genocide which were no less harrowing than Bosnia, yet failed to act to prevent the carnage. Likewise, while the images of Trnopolje concentration camp in 1992 caused international condemnation, they did not yield decisive military action, since non-intervention was the policy of states such as the US at the time.73 By 1995, the images of the Srebrenica massacre led to international intervention largely because of a change in political will,
particularly of the US. It was this change in perceptions of state self-interest, rather than the propaganda effect of images of suffering, that precipitated decisive intervention in the Yugoslav wars.

Image control is equally important in Ukraine, a point apparently recognised by Putin in both Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Ensuring the Russian forces sent to help annex Crimea wore no obvious insignia that would identify them as Russian soldiers enabled Putin to claim that Russian separatist civil defence forces were solely responsible, and acting legitimately to protect themselves. Again, this deception might have appeared obvious to Western audiences, but it generated enough doubt of who was responsible to facilitate the pro-Russian propaganda campaign in Ukraine. Putin’s use of unidentifiable forces was and is an exceptional example of image control in modern conflict, since it made the information environment murky enough to give him plausible deniability for Russian actions. The subsequent admission of the truth of Russia’s involvement was moot given the lack of Western intent or capability to respond meaningfully in Crimea.

In the Yugoslav wars, the interaction of propaganda with the willingness of external powers to intervene was similarly nuanced. Arguably the main effect of images such as those of Trnopolje concentration camp was not to incite external intervention but to delegitimise the Serbian cause, so that a war in which no side was in truth an innocent victim was perceived to be the action of a single aggressor. In Kosovo, Milosevic attempted to portray Serbia as a victim as he televised images of Serb civilians standing on bridges facing NATO air attacks. Yet he could not convince the international community of Serbia’s innocence when images were published of trainloads of Kosovar Albanians arriving at the Macedonian border, drawing immediate comparisons with the Holocaust. Whereas Putin’s image management introduced doubt regarding culpability for the situation in Ukraine, Milosevic’s unsuccessful image management delegitimised the Serb cause in Kosovo leaving no doubt who was at fault. Ultimately though, image management or not, Milosevic’s cause was clearly illegitimate, since he was conducting ethnic cleansing on a massive scale.

Conclusion

To conclude, what can be learnt from the Yugoslav wars and from Ukraine about the use of propaganda today? Both Yugoslavia and Ukraine bear the hallmarks of ‘ethnic conflict’, in which identity groups are mobilised to fight against Others supposedly bent on their destruction. However in both cases, conflict was and is being driven by elites, manipulating identity for political purposes, rather than deep-seated ethnic animosity. This has placed Ukraine in a dangerous situation where provocations may precipitate a security dilemma, in addition to the spectre of external Russian intervention. This requires a response that coordinates the physical, the diplomatic and the psychological. The strategic use of communication is vital, but the West must recognise that words must be backed up with decisive action.

War cannot be won by propaganda alone, but poor media and public relations strategy can certainly lose wars. Each of the protagonists in the Yugoslav wars placed propaganda at the centre of their strategies; with the exception of Slovenia they did not master how to do so effectively. Nonetheless, the experiences of each of the belligerents have yielded invaluable lessons regarding the significance of propaganda to strategy.

The lesson from the Slovenian war is that media and propaganda campaigns are most likely to be effective if they are meticulously planned and ideally short. This does not guarantee success, but it places the belligerent in prime position to exploit information opportunities as they arise. The lesson from the Croatian and Bosnian wars is that, as reinforced by conflicts such as Syria, victimhood may generate humanitarian aid but should not be relied upon for military support.

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75 Michalski & Gow, 2007.
76 Hentea, 2006.
intervention is still based on whether it is in the interests of individual states.

What can be learnt from the current situation in Ukraine? Firstly, that propaganda and censorship are still influential, even in the global media age. Even in a networked media environment where information can become ‘viral’ at a moment’s notice, it is still possible to use traditional propaganda methods to introduce enough doubt to achieve limited political objectives. The West should take note, rather than devoting their energies to determining the ideal terminology to describe (and obscure) their communication operations.

Perhaps the key lesson regarding the significance of propaganda in these conflicts is a lesson Serbia failed to learn: that no amount of propaganda can legitimise certain actions. The only option if massacre and deportation, rape and execution are the basis of strategy is absolute external censorship. Since this is virtually impossible today, propaganda’s ability to positively influence the outcome of such a strategy is limited. Propaganda was central to strategy for each of the protagonists in the Yugoslav wars, as it clearly is in Ukraine. Ultimately though, it is actions, rather than words or images, that are most decisive in determining the outcome.

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The Good, the Bad, the Drones: A Strife Five-Part Series

These pieces are all reprinted from the Strife blog at strifeblog.org, where they were posted during April 2014. All web references were last accessed on 6th May 2014.

Introduction
Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife

By 2025 it is estimated to be an industry worth $82 billion USD and responsible for the creation of more than 100,000 new jobs in the US alone. It will target commercial and civil markets, and be used in applications ranging from precision agriculture and public safety, to niche areas, such as battling poachers in wildlife reserves. It is, however, their use in security operations which will be the focus of this Strife series.

The controversial use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), more widely known as drones, has been recently highlighted by a UN Special Rapporteur examining their use in counterterrorism, news stories of victims of drone attacks testifying before US Congress, as well as recent documentaries such as Jeremy Scahill’s Dirty Wars. There are even iPhone apps, such as Metadata, which have tracked and mapped drone attacks since the first known incident on November 3, 2002 in Yemen. Since then, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that upwards of 4,172 people have been killed in strikes across Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan, 1,032 of which were civilians. Afghanistan has seen at least 59 civilian deaths under ISAF, while the number in Iraq and Libya remain less clear. Organizations such as UK-based Reprieve call for international accountability for what they refer to as ‘the new face of state-lawlessness in the name of counterterrorism’.

The use of drones, however, has been supported by some as an option which has left the forces using them safe, reduced the amount of potential civilian casualties, and eliminated key targets in areas often referred to otherwise as ‘terrorist safe havens’. The use of drones has also been viewed by analysts like Clint Watts, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, as the latest piece of the US counter-terrorism package which has traversed from ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, detentions and renditions, to the ‘clear, hold, build’ policies seen in Afghanistan, and most recently focusing on drones as the most effective and publicly accepted counterterrorism policy.

Drones will not be exiting the security scene anytime soon. Instead, we hope this series will provoke more thought and debate in a field that will play a significant part in all our lives in the coming years. We leave you to be the judge in ‘The Good, the Bad, the Drones.’

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1 http://www.auvsi.org/resources/economicreport
4 http://dirtywars.org/the-film
5 http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/
7 http://www.reprieve.org.uk/investigations/drones/
8 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139453/daniel-bymann/why-drones-work
9 http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/podcast-counterterrorism-drones-syria-and-more/
Part I: Pakistan’s Decade of Drones (2004-2014)
Zoha Waseem

In June 2004, the first drone strike in Pakistan targeted a man who had rejected peace agreements with the government, sworn allegiance to the Taliban, and vowed to continue his ‘jihad’ against the United States in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military initially claimed responsibility for Nek Mohammad’s death, until more could be revealed about the drone programme. It was speculated that Pakistan granted CIA access into its airspace in order to take Mohammad out. This was to be the first of several hundred such attacks that neither the American nor Pakistani administrations were willing to officially acknowledge. Musharraf would later go on record to justify these attacks: ‘In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time.’

Indeed, they would. Following the strike on Nek Mohammad, there would be 44 attacks under the Bush administration. The drone campaign initially made use of the notorious Shamsi Airfield near Quetta, leased to the CIA in 2001. In 2011, NATO forces opened fire on two Pakistani border check-posts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, unleashing a country-wide outrage, and resulting in Islamabad ordering the US to evacuate. The total numbers of strikes in Pakistan have ranged from 330 to over 380, escalating dramatically under the Obama administration. Those targeted are suspected of belonging primarily to al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and various Pakistani and foreign jihadi organisations, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The campaign in Pakistan has been largely restricted to FATA, a region where the concentration of militants has been overwhelming. Located northwest of Pakistan, FATA borders Afghanistan on the eastern side of the Durand Line. The tribal areas fall outside the writ of Pakistani law and governance – a weakness that the US and terrorists alike draw to their own advantages for respective onslaughts and campaigns.

Casualty Controversies
The calculation of civilian casualties has always been an area of contention. To an extent, this is understandable given the challenges of reporting from within the tribal areas. Additionally, the environment in FATA, their complex terrains and geographies makes it difficult to differentiate civilians from militants who blend in by living amongst locals.

Regardless, American and Pakistani authorities have not been forthcoming in acknowledging drone attacks or their casualties and the recognition of civilian deaths has been misleading. In March 2013, Pakistani officials claimed that between 400 and 600 civilians had been killed; in October, the Pakistani Ministry of Defence claimed the figure stood at 67 since 2008. A month later, Islamabad retracted the statement, claiming it was ‘wrong and fabricated’.

The table on the next page summarises the data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation and the Government of Pakistan on drone strikes in the country.

The CIA maintains these strikes are ‘surgically precise’. It has yet to officially acknowledge any civilian casualty.

The only game in town
The question of Islamabad’s consent has been the centre of debates on drones in Pakistan. In one article, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann wrote, ‘Behind the scenes, many Pakistani officials – including [former] president Asif Ali Zardari and [then] Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani – have supported the drone strikes, despite their occasional public

2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15901363
Local perceptions from within Pakistan suggest a majority of people believe they are carried out by Islamabad’s consent. Amnesty International’s Pakistan Researcher, Mustafa Qadri told Strife that Pakistan may have given tacit approval but there is no paper trail.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to President Obama last year, along with his plea to stop drone strikes, was little but a political move to show his countrymen that the Sharif government does not condone breaches of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Islamabad relies immensely on aid from the US. Telling the Americans what to do would mean disrupting an incoming flow of dollars; acknowledging approval for drones would result in a severe backlash from Pakistani militants and civil society alike; keeping the debate running under the shadow of dubious press releases, timely condemnations, and a lack of transparency, allows Islamabad to control resistance from within the Pakistani populace, appease local militants, and avoid upsetting allies in D.C.

Within the US, the debate has steadily been questioning American foreign policy in the war on terror. Mazzetti pointed out in his book, *The Way of the Knife*, that this ‘knife fighting’ is not as surgical as agencies claim. It ‘creates enemies just as it has obliterated them’ and has ‘lowered the bar for waging war’.

Despite protests from the likes of David Kilcullen and Cameron Munter, Leon Panetta has notoriously described the drone programme as ‘the only game in town’.

An aspect that is often under-considered is how drones have contributed to militant propaganda. The TTP has repeatedly used the destruction caused by drones to further their ‘jihad’. Till 2009, estimates suggested the TTP and allied groups carried out suicide attacks in retaliation for drone strikes. Either way, civilians have been at the receiving end which has made it easier to instil anti-American sentiments within the aggrieved populace. As a result, the campaign has resulted in heated debates within Pakistan, leaving its citizens divided.

**Local Debates, Perspectives and Impacts**

The case against drone attacks within Pakistan has been most aggressively taken up by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s chairman, Imran Khan. The social and psychological impacts of drones are the main arguments put forth by Khan, who believes drones (and American presence in the region in general) have created terrorism in the country. Amnesty’s Qadri disagrees. ‘Drones are not the drivers of radicalization; local, social factors are’.

Qadri’s own investigations into the campaign (published in Amnesty’s report, *Will I Be Next?) took him across Pakistan, making him critically

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aware of local perceptions. ‘The closer you get to FATA, the more sympathy you will find for drone strikes. People don’t like the Taliban. They are annoyed with terrorists. When you’re in such a violent region, people think, at least there are terrorists being killed [by drones]. It is not morally justified, but they are saying it out of frustration. [Drones] appear to be the least worst option out of some very bad options.’

A more extreme case for drone attacks was made by a columnist, Irfan Hussain. 2009 was known as ‘the year of the drone’ in Pakistan. Shortly after, Hussain asked, ‘If we condemn the Americans so vociferously over the drone campaign, should we not be more critical of the thugs who are killing far more Pakistani civilians?’ Hussain’s opinions are amongst the minority; the majority still protests against drones.

The anti-drone advocacy in Pakistan goes beyond the element of fear. Little is written about the rural-to-urban displacement of people since the start of the campaign. The displacement of people from northern areas to cities further strains the limited resources allocated for urban areas like Karachi. Conflicted cities, aggravated by an influx of IDPs, increase instability and deepen anti-American sentiments amongst the urban and liberal populace.

Moreover, the campaign has made Pakistanis doubtful about local and international humanitarian efforts. “It is difficult for aid agencies [including polio workers], local and foreign, to operate in these areas. Locals tend to think [these workers] are being used for spying”, points out Mustafa Qadri, resonating a view that has been prevalent since the Abbottabad raid of May 2001.

Another concerning matter is the lack of rehabilitation and reconstruction accompanying the campaign. Since there are no official agencies appointed for these efforts, groups such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charity wing of Lashkar-e-Taiba, are able to sweep in to assist the locals, further propagating anti-Pakistani and anti-American rhetoric. Coupled with this is the fact that often two strikes occur consecutively at a given location; when locals reach the location following the first strike to provide assistance, a second hits. This makes local rescue operations much more difficult.

Internal impacts, popular dissent against drones and relations between the US and Pakistan may be contributing to a gradual decrease in strikes. In an unprecedented move, these factors led the Peshawar High Court to direct the government to move a resolution against the attacks in the United Nations. The historic verdict declared drones as ‘illegal, inhumane, and a violation of the UN charter on human rights’.

Last December, after pressure from Pakistan, the UN adopted a resolution on drone strikes, calling on the US to comply with international law. In March this year, the UNHCR held a third round of discussions on the draft resolution. Washington boycotted, refusing to supply UN any details about its programme.

It is unclear whether the campaign will remain paused for the duration of negotiations between the Pakistan government and the TTP. It can be assumed that Pakistan may witness a decrease in the number of strikes as NATO withdrawal is undertaken from Afghanistan and as western interests shift from South Asia. Till then, it suffices to say that Pakistan’s decade of drones has caused yet another rift in the country’s socio-political fabric.

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6 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/will-i-be-next-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan

9 http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/19/exclusive_us_boycotts_un_drone_talks
Part II: Daring to Use Drones: Why Targeted Killings are a Necessary Component in Modern Counter-Insurgency Campaigns

David C. Hofmann

Fuelled by the global ‘war on terror’ that emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, Western democracies have been steadily increasing their use of drone strikes to kill key operational and ideological members within insurgent groups in Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The state-sanctioned and strategic targeted killing of terrorists/insurgents is a controversial topic, and raises numerous moral and legal issues. However, the realities of war are changing. For the most part, traditional battlefields have been replaced by insurgent campaigns conducted by hardened Islamist groups like the Taliban and al-Shabaab. In order to adapt to the realities and characteristics of this genre of conflict, drone strikes have become a crucial component within larger counter-insurgency strategies, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

Why Drone Strikes are Necessary

Despite valid concerns over the ethics and legality of drone strikes, targeted killings remain one of the best coercive options currently available to combat well-entrenched insurgent movements in lawless areas. The inability and/or unwillingness of local government forces to combat or apprehend insurgent operatives necessitates outside intervention in order to ensure continued international and local security. Counter-insurgency options, however, are limited within this particular context. Traditional military assaults on guerrilla fighters who have superior knowledge of the landscape are tactically unsound, as seen in the on-going conflict in Afghanistan. Non-coercive methods are also limited (but not impossible) due to the ideological, apocalyptic and fanatical nature of most Islamist insurgent groups. The human and material costs of a ‘boots on the ground’ intervention are often prohibitive, and alternatives such as scorched earth tactics are wildly disproportionate and unethical. Furthermore, many insurgent groups enjoy broad public support. Traditional military invasion provides ample time for important operatives to go ‘underground’ and avoid apprehension. As a result of these and other factors, drone strikes emerge as one of the more practical and tactically sound options within theatres of war such as certain portions of the Pashtun region of Pakistan, the regions of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, and other similar locales.

The ability to strike at key players within insurgent groups without the mobilization of large-scale ground forces also has significant domestic and international political ramifications. The evidence suggests that drone strikes are popular with domestic audiences, who want and often demand a proportionate retributive response to terrorism without the need for mass deployment of troops. Within the international context, the legacy of the post-9/11 invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have created an environment wherein large scale Western military efforts can be perceived as an illegitimate invasion, an attempt at colonization, or as an economic exploitation of the invaded country (e.g., ‘blood for oil’). The use of targeted killing strikes a balance between these two pressing political concerns by assuaging domestic audiences’ desire for retribution while simultaneously allaying some, but not all,

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3 Byman, 2013, p. 102; David, 2003, pp. 7-8.
concerns of Western imperialism by avoiding a long term ‘boots on the ground’ conflict.

Why Drone Strikes are Effective
Drone strikes have also proven to be effective at hampering insurgent groups and in hastening the end of their larger campaigns. Recent empirical evidence suggests that when used as a part of larger counter-insurgency strategy, targeted killing decreases operational capabilities, decreases professionalism, and increases the likelihood of organizational death. The prevailing argument is that repeated strikes against operational and ideologically important members of insurgent groups erodes long-term capabilities to plan and execute attacks by denying them the specialized skillsets of trainers, bomb makers, and ideologues. Furthermore, the use of drone strikes can lead to a deterrent effect by increasing the physical and social costs associated with engaging in armed conflict. Lastly, efforts expended to remain ‘underground’ out of a fear of being targeted by drones diverts energies that would normally go towards the planning and execution of terrorist attacks.

The Future of Targeted Killing and Drone Strikes
As long as belligerents remain entrenched in locales that inhibit practical non-coercive or legal approaches to counter-insurgency, the best option is the proportional and strategic removal of operatives via drone strikes. However, the practice of targeted killing remains generally misunderstood by the public. If targeted killing is to stay as a cornerstone piece in Western counter-insurgency campaigns, efforts must be made by practising governments to address some of the moral and legal concerns surrounding the tactic. This will require the adoption of policies that add elements of transparency, legal review and comprehensive guidelines that determine when, where and how targeted killing can and should occur. To do otherwise risks sinking to the level of indiscriminate violence practised by many insurgent and terrorist groups.

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Part III: War, Peace and the Spaces In Between: Drones in International Law
Jack McDonald

*The Legal Regulation of UAVs*

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)\(^1\) don’t have to be used as weapons, but military UAVs require the same regulation as any other weapon system. Since the American use of UAVs to conduct targeted killings of people it defines as militants and terrorists, activists in a number of countries, notably Code Pink, have argued that their use should be stopped, and that these systems should face greater regulation.\(^2\) Even though war and armed conflict are activities in which killing is legally sanctioned, the law of armed conflict places restrictions on the use of weapons, as well as deeming certain classes of weaponry to be illegal. The division between the two is neither neat, nor particularly logical without reference to the history of treaty law banning particular methods and means of warfare. Weapons that cannot be used without breaking key principles of the law of armed conflict (military necessity, proportionality and distinction) are illegal in essence. Weapons that are arbitrarily deemed illegal by treaty are also unusable by states adhering to commonly accepted interpretations of the law of armed conflict. The general consensus is that UAVs aren’t inherently illegal, but, like any other weapon, they may be used in an illegal manner.\(^3\) The furore over the regulation of UAVs does, however, raise a number of issues about the role of international law in regulating the use of violence in war and armed conflict.

*Processes of Banning Weapons*

It appears unlikely that UAVs will be banned by a specific convention, however the calls for greater regulation of their use, particularly by non-state organisations, illustrates a key issue with the regulation of warfare in the contemporary world. The law of armed conflict is state-centric: states agree amongst themselves the precise wording of treaties to which they agree, determine for themselves the national interpretations of those treaties, and act accordingly. As students on War Studies’ International Peace & Security MA will no doubt be aware, international law is therefore constituted by politics, power, belief and practise. Over the past twenty years, however, NGOs have played an increasing role in the formation of international law.

The law regulating the use of weapons places limitations upon lawful means in warfare. Even if states differ in their interpretations of where the boundary between innately unlawful and lawful weapons lie, they all recognise that some means and methods are manifestly illegal. The starkest example of this lies in the arguments that comprise the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on nuclear weapons.\(^4\) It is difficult, if not impossible, to discriminate between civilians and permissible military targets when using nuclear weapons (setting aside the point that strategic nuclear weapons were routinely aimed at population centres) and it is hard to conceive of a weapon with such disproportionate effects. Despite this, some states argued that the weapons were not illegal in and of themselves. The primary means of determining the legality of a given weapon is the ‘Article 36 process’. This refers to article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions (1977) that requires states to consider and examine whether new means and methods of warfare could breach any current provision of international law. States make a point of ascertaining whether the weapons that they use are, in effect, admissible to the legal framework of armed conflict and warfare.

The issue highlighted by the prospect of UAV regulation is that states appear to consider them

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\(^1\) Or ‘drone’, ‘unmanned combat aerial vehicle’, ‘remote piloted air system’, depending on the writer.

\(^2\) See, for example, droneswatch.org, a coalition founded by Code Pink

\(^3\) The end use of UAVs for targeted killings presents a host of legal issues. The best single volume introduction to the subject is Finkelstein, Ohlin and Altman Eds.’ Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, Oxford University Press, 2012

\(^4\) Commonly referred to as the Nuclear Weapons case. It is worth reading the full opinion, as well as the various decisions on pages 42 onwards: www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf
legal, following article 36 considerations, but activists seek to push states to either regulate them further, or ban them entirely. Specific treaty bans on types of weapon are enough to render them illegal, but these require the acceptance of states. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, resulted in the widespread adoption of the landmine ban (the Ottawa Treaty), was not supported by notable states such as America, Russia and China. The subsequent effort to push states to ban cluster munitions attracted less support, and, again, lacked the support of significant military powers. Although NGOs have been able to influence a large number of states, without the support of an overwhelming majority of states (and, most importantly, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) their ultimate influence is limited. The key issue here is the legitimacy of the means warfare, and the role that law plays in legitimising political violence. It is in this regard that international law appears to be somewhat out of step with significant sections of popular opinion. While states do ‘hold the cards’ to the extent that NGOs have no legal authority over their actions, it is clear that NGOs play a role in delegitimising some means of warfare in the eyes of the public. Adhering to legal obligations, such as the Article 36 process, doesn’t necessarily legitimise a weapons system in the eyes of the public, whereas an NGO criticising the use of a weapons system, such as UAVs, doesn’t make that system illegal.

Non-Obvious Warfare and International Law

The key challenge of UAVs is that they enable the conduct of hostilities in a manner that was previously unthinkable. The idea that a state could use violence by ‘remote control’ is nothing new, as Michael Ignatieff’s reflections on the Kosovo conflict made clear prior to the rise of UAVs. However, the degree of precision in remote warfare was previously low – Tomahawk missiles might be able to strike a target, but they could not do so in the manner that UAV operators are able to alter predicted blast patterns in near-real time.

Evolving technology, and novel uses of technology, enable armed conflicts to be conducted in a manner far beyond the imagination of those who laid the foundations of the law of armed conflict. One way of thinking about this is the relationship between the visibility of an armed conflict, and the law that regulates it. The law of armed conflict is founded in visible or ‘obvious’ warfare. As Martin Libicki outlined in a 2012 Strategic Studies Quarterly article, novel technologies permit war to be fought with entirely non-visible, or ambiguous means. The use of UAVs exacerbates this (Libicki referred to it as ‘drone warfare’). Where, for example, is the ‘battlefield’ in UAV use? What use is the concept of ‘combat’ where one participant is half a world away, in an air-conditioned environment? These issues pre-date UAVs, but the maturation of this technology enables violence to occur in situations far removed from those commonly associated with armed conflict. Whether this is a positive or negative development is a matter of opinion at this stage, but it also exposes key aspects of warfare which were previously taken for granted.

The protection of non-combatants is a key purpose of the law of armed conflict. A significant issue with the use of UAVs is that their lack of visibility deprives third parties to a given armed conflict of the ability to separate themselves from it. Even if we take as a given that an armed conflict exists between America and al-Qaeda (which is by no means certain, or accepted by critics) then one conducted by UAV strikes and other sporadic bursts of violence make it extremely difficult to determine the places in which people are at risk of being killed by error or accepted consequence. Even if the American use of UAVs is (as claimed) more precise than any previous era of warfare, this method of warfare also deprives those affected by it of simple means of protecting themselves. By this, I mean that civilians who are no part of the purported conflict have no method of disassociating themselves from it. In any

5 See Michael Ignatieff: Virtual War, Vintage: 2001


7 This is a key criticism of the American use of UAVs, as well as a wider theoretical point. See, for example, Mary Ellen O’Connell: Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, SSRN: 2009; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1501144
‘normal’ armed conflict, a civilian who wishes to preserve their life (above their livelihood and normal way of life) usually has the option of becoming a refugee when they perceive the approach of military forces. The lot of a refugee is far from safe, nor should it be considered as a ‘good’ outcome in the normal sense of the word. However, as the current Syrian civil war demonstrates, civilians are able to separate themselves from violence that would otherwise kill them, even if it results in an often harsh existence. Where states choose to wage war by non-obvious means, civilians have no way of ascertaining their immediate danger. An armed conflict might pass them by without ever entering earshot, or it might result in their death for standing too close to people that a state, halfway around the world, has determined are lawful military targets. None of this is explicitly illegal, but the continued use of UAVs by state militaries is likely to lead to further pressure from NGOs and the public as a result of these issues. I doubt these will lead to a ban, but states will have to argue their case for the continued use of UAVs beyond their ‘simple’ legality.

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Drones are slowly making their way into our modern lives. They can now deliver books, medical marijuana, or beer to sailors at sea. In the next few years, drones will dramatically change our lives. Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni youth activist, explains how they have already changed the social fabric of his country.

‘May you die in a drone strike’ has now become people’s favourite curse, and when a parent wants a child to behave, he/she only needs to threaten to ‘call the drones,’ and the child will comply with any request. In the Global North, drones bring modernity to your doorstep. In Yemen, they deliver death.

The exact number of drone strikes in Yemen cannot be fully ascertained, due to the covert nature of US operations in the region. While the first strike was carried out in 2002, all others have taken place after President Obama took office in 2009.

The table on the next page summarises the data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation, the Long War Journal and the Government of Yemen on drone strikes in the country.

In Yemen, drone strikes are only part of the story regarding the targeted killings performed by the United States government against, allegedly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP). Other types of attacks can be launched from US Navy warships or army bases in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, whose fighter planes also participate in the US war on AQAP in Yemen. The public is being reassured that targeted killings are all carefully regulated, and that only terrorists are dying, minus a few collateral deaths that outweigh the potential civilian deaths resulting from an actual act of terrorism.

Grounds for targeted killings

On what grounds can a targeted killing take place? Al-Muslimi has had a lot of time to reflect on this. His village, Wessab, was targeted by a strike on April 17th, 2013. Six days later, he testified before the US Senate on the attack. An anti-drone activist since then, he explains that two are types of killings. Under the first type, the United States Department of Justice provided three clear conditions for a killing to take place: the person has to be designated as a person of interest and he or she must represent a direct threat to the US; the target cannot be captured; and, finally, the operation must not target civilians. The other type is the ‘signature strike’, whereby any high-ranking military officer can order the death of anyone displaying suspicious behaviour. There lies a rather complex problem for any civilian: ‘What is suspicious behaviour in the US is completely normal behaviour here,’ explains Farea. ‘It can represent every single Yemeni in Yemen. If I am with you, going to a wedding outside Sana’a, we will obviously be between the age of 15 and 65, we will be carrying guns [they are part of the Yemeni dress code], and we will be a group, [that’s] enough! It is not even intelligent criteria anymore.’

Questions of effectiveness

These criteria raise many questions. First, if anyone can potentially be targeted, how effective can the strikes be in relation to weakening AQAP in the region? Moreover, are

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1 Interview with Farea Al-Muslimi, Sana’a, Yemen, January 7th, 2014.
2 See www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/americas/article3647656.ece
3 See Barack Obama’s remarks at the National Defence University (NDU): hwww.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama
4 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtQ_mMKx3Ck
6 President Obama stated in the NDU speech referenced above that this type of strike would be examined. The Wedding Party strike of December 2013 suggests that ‘signature strikes’ are still active, since the wedding convoy was mistaken for an AQAP convoy: www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/us-drone-strike-wedding-party-yemen_n_4434127.html
the conditions highlighted by Barack Obama ever being met? Several attacks come to mind, some of them involving drones, others both drones and missiles sent from US Navy ships. The first one is that of al Majaala, on December 17th, 2009, portrayed in Jeremy Scahill’s 2013 documentary Dirty Wars. The target of this attack was Mohammed al-Qazimi, a former alleged al-Qaeda associate who had spent five years in a Yemeni jail, and had been released shortly before the strike. Since he had returned to Maajala, he had been passing by an army checkpoint morning and afternoon to go and buy his daily bread and khat. He could easily have been arrested and tried at any time for any crimes he was accused of. Did he represent a known threat to the Yemeni government? It is unlikely that he would have ever been released from prison if he did. Fifty-five people died on that day, including 14 women, seven of which were pregnant, and 21 children. A second attack of interest is that of Qawlan, on January 23rd, 2013. On that day, a known opponent of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Rabieh Hamud Labieh, was travelling by car. Labieh was a democratically elected local councillor who had turned against former President Saleh during the 2011 Arab Spring-related demonstrations. Labieh was notorious for having denounced the smuggling of government weapons between Sana’a and Saleh’s countryside stronghold right after his demise. He had been an opponent to the new regime, arguing that the country was still a dictatorship. Once again, why should he be targeted by the US government, except to contribute to a Yemeni government purge? Eight people died on that day, all civilians with no connections to AQAP.

**AQAP, the ‘moderates’ and anti-US sentiment**

Al-Muslini remarks that the strike against his own village in April 2013 has increased anti-US sentiment throughout the region, hence boosting the local support for AQAP by default. The fact that AQAP now occasionally compensates villagers after drone strikes is a politically savvy move, clearly winning local hearts and minds in the process and also undermining the Yemeni government, which rarely offers compensation after strikes. Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, director of HOOD, a Yemeni-based Human Rights NGO, makes a...

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1 For a detailed account of the US government involvement in Yemen and the Majaala attack, see: www.thenation.com/article/159578/dangerous-game-yemen?page=0,2
2 *Khat* is a locally grown leaf that is chewed daily for its stimulant properties.
4 Interview with Mohammed al-Qawli, Qawlan, Yemen, January 8th 2014.
Barman argues that moderates within the organization have been purged to the benefit of hardliners, all thanks to drone strikes. He mentions the recent killing of two moderate al-Qaeda officials by a strikes, Fadel Qasr and Mohammed el-Hamda. According to him, Qasr and el-Hamda were members of the AQAP council, the Shura, which decides on operations across the country. They both had withdrawn during the vote on several operations, which they did not agree with. Their names and locations were conveniently given to the Yemeni government, which then forwarded them to the US. According to Ali Barman, AQAP’s military leader, Qasm al-Raimi, is actually very close to the previous and current governments. If this is indeed the case as Ali Barman alleges, then indirectly, the US government would be aiding and abating AQAP, helping it purging its moderates. Of importance here is the idea that moderates within AQAP and other al-Qaeda related organizations seem to be more inclined towards addressing social justice issues, rather than directly challenging the State into the formation of an exclusive Caliphate.

Drone strikes and targeted killings in Yemen are a very complex affair, much more so than the US government would like to admit. All parties involved, except the local population, seem to be benefiting from them. Ali Barman recalls the funeral of the Al-Maajala victims with emotion, especially an old lady who pleaded, referring to the US: “They even have laws that protect animals, why can’t they just consider us like their animals?” Drones and the protection of animals in the US are two great signs of progress. In Yemen, they bear a sinister meaning. If the drone program continues in Yemen, the support from the population towards AQAP is likely to become much stronger, this due to the fact that many more civilians die in strikes than AQAP operatives, and that when AQAP members are targeted and killed, there are many candidates to replace them, often being more radical than their predecessors. Since it is public knowledge that the Yemeni government provides its US ally with the necessary intelligence before a strike, popular support can only go one way, that of AQAP.

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11 Interview with Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, Sana’a, Yemen, January 9th 2014.

12 In December 2013, the Yemeni parliament almost unanimously called for an end to drone strikes in their country. The vote was a clear disavowal of Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s support for and collaboration with the drone program. See: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/15/world/meast/ye men-drones/

13 The author has recently initiated a research on the issue of moderate al-Qaeda affiliates in Fallujah, Iraq. For preliminary results, see: V. Fontan, ‘Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there was a field’, in Harmonie Toros & Yannis Tellidis (eds.), Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition, Routledge, forthcoming in August 2014.
Part V. The Biopolitics of Drone Warfare
Daniel Møller Ølgaard

The current debate on armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, focuses mostly on legal implications and moral implications of their use. Issues such as civilian deaths, as well as the strategic implications and tactical advantages of drones are reigning supreme in the academic and public discussions. Yet these examinations fail to look at the wider implications of drone warfare. Through the prism of ‘biopolitics’, we can expose how war and governance is transformed and how increasingly life itself comes to be categorized and populations come to be controlled through the use of armed UAV’s.

A Biopolitical Understanding of War

With the emergence of a liberal paradigm, where the right of the individual trumps the rights of the sovereign, a global system of liberal governance is changing the way in which war is conducted. This has been characterized as the ‘liberal peace project’, and is associated widely with Kant’s notion of perpetual peace through the pursuit of cosmopolitan values.

As such, the concept of war is changing. Today, according to Derek Gregory, ‘vulnerabilities are differentially distributed but widely dispersed, and in consequence … late modern war is being changed by the slippery spaces through which it is conducted.’ As we enter a ‘global state of war’ where threats to liberal life are indeed seen as omnipresent, political and technological measures of control aimed at categorizing bodies and dividing populations become the basic principle of liberal governance in securing populations.

In drawing on Foucault’s notion of ‘biopolitics’, this form of control can be examined in terms of power directed at the control of populations; a ‘governmentality’ that works through the promise of protecting life rather than threatening it. As a consequence, ‘biopolitics is the pursuit of war by other means’ and is weaved into all layers of socio-political action on an increasingly global scale.

To perform this, the state apparatus of modern liberal states are, according to Julian Reid and Michael Dillon, ‘comprised of techniques that examine the detailed properties and dynamics of populations so that they can be better managed with respect to their many needs and life chances’. Yet, in order to enhance life, the principal task of liberal governance must first be to define life along the line of those who are to be protected and those who are deemed threats.

The Virtue of the Drone

Several authors have pointed to an emerging drone strategy that, rather than identifying ‘known’ individuals from personal characteristics, focuses on examining, characterizing, dividing and targeting certain patterns of life as threatening. These signature strikes are performed on the basis of the movement of bodies. For example, simply being approached by suspected Taliban members can make you a target of drone strikes. This clearly indicates a move away from the official US emphasis on drones as tools to eliminate identified individuals, to a strategy ‘which takes as its target potential rather than actual risks’. Characteristically, in defining legitimate targets for drone strikes outside of war zones the US defines combatants as all military-age males killed in a strike zone unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.

Consequently, for Shaw, ‘dangerous signatures or patterns of life are assessed on their very potential to become dangerous’. Anyone in the

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3 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
7 Shaw, 2013 p. 548
proximity of a suspected threat is in essence targetable, and as the focus shifts from known threats to potential risks, everyone in essence becomes a potential subject to surveillance, control and punishment. It is here the drone most clearly emerges as a ‘technology of control’, that directs its power at groups and populations on a wider scale, rather than the individual body. The population subjected to its power is transformed from corporeal, fleshy bodies to sets of digital data that are categorized, catalogued and evaluated. In this way, life comes to be life as information; a mass of data on maps of movement rather than fleshy bodies.

In fact, it is the very lack of the human, both in terms of the digitisation of the body of the victim, but also specifically the lack of a pilot, that renders the drone a tool of a ‘clean’ war where the operator is situated in another space, free from the fog of war and is thus rendered less likely to fall short to human error. This is clearly reminiscent of Foucault’s notion of biopower that hides its use of violence and ‘gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which it appears to be free of all excess and violence’.

Drones, Discipline and Global Governance
Yet, rather than punishing and targeting threats with the aim of integrating them into the global state of liberal governance, it seems that the drones are a tool to patrol and control; preventing threatening life from entering the global. What makes the drone so significant to how power and governance is imposed globally is its role as a technology of control that is in a sense enforcing a global liberal governmentality; a technology that is comprised of biopolitical techniques that examines, divides, and seeks to control populations through a promise of enhancing life for those living outside the targeted areas.

In essence, drones can be said to perform what Vivienne Jabri has characterized as ‘policing access to the modern’ and to pre-empt threatening life from entering space deemed ‘safe’. Drawing on Foucault, one might even characterize the armed drones as a manifestation of the late modern Panopticon, a conceptualization of the omnipresent ‘tower of control’ patrolling the distant borderlands. This form of governance works not only through kinetic violence; it utilizes fear and anxiety that spreads through the population of the targeted areas. It does not impose control exclusively through death, but rather through the constant potentiality of death. In this way, areas such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan are moving ever closer to a space of total control. Here, to quote Foucault, in ‘this enclosed, segmented space … in which each individual figure is constantly located, examined and distributed’ a ‘compact model of the disciplinary mechanism’ is formed.

Except, in the case of drones, the surveillance of each individual figure becomes biopolitical as the tools of control are focused on life as mass rather than on individual bodies. Areas such as the FATA becomes sites of assessment and control, visible tropes of biopolitical power that focus on dividing the global population through technologies of control, to impose governance on a massive, global scale.

The drone, rather than a mere weapon, is a biopolitical tool aimed just as much at examining populations as it is killing individuals. The armed drone has both the capabilities and the (biopolitical) agency to categorize, catalogue and kill bodies, and its violence directed at ‘them’ is masked behind the promise to enhance life for ‘us’. As such, the conditions and capabilities for examining, categorizing and dividing bodies on an increasingly global scale are greatly enhanced with the emergence of the drone as a tool of war.

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8 The term was coined by Carl von Clausewitz and was made famous by former US Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, which illustrates the difficulties of making decisions in the midst of conflict, chaos and uncertainty.
9 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-76, Picador, 2003, p. 203
10 Vivienne Jabri, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity, Routledge, 2013, pp. 31-56
Book Reviews

Alan James on Claire Jowitt’s *The Culture of Piracy*
Alister Wedderburn on Bonnie Honig’s *Antigone, Interrupted*
Anton Tomisov on David Parrott’s *The Business of War*
Thomas Colley on Martin A. Miller’s *The Foundations of Modern Terrorism*


There are some interesting parallels between Claire Jowitt’s book on the ‘culture of piracy’ and the latest of N.A.M. Rodger’s many pleas to his fellow historians to use the definitions and legal terms related to private violence at sea with greater care. We should certainly take heed of these exhortations, for if early modern naval historians can offer anything to the greater academic project of understanding modern warfare it should be insight into the complex interplay between private and public violence in the past. Yet, in ‘The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare’ recently published in the *Mariner’s Mirror*, Rodger insists that imprecision and confusion in the use of language is the reason ‘it is so difficult to find a coherent analysis of piracy’.1 So law and language, it would appear, are the key themes to address for our collective academic redemption. For Jowitt, too, language and artistic representations in general are the subject, though it’s the language of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century literary world that interests her. Here, too, the relationship of language to the law is important. In a world in which jurists famously debated notions of *mare liberum* or *mare clausum*, for example, seaborne crime was a politically charged and illustrative literary device. On stage and in print, pirate characters debated their legal status and negotiated their private hierarchies and micro-societies. The very legal ambiguity of piracy itself made it a powerful vehicle for contemporary political commentary.

Rodger and Jowitt both recognise that although the term ‘piracy’ is sometimes used synonymously with lawlessness and ostracism, this can be a trap. There was no neat distinction in the early modern period between the pirate outlaw and the law-abiding merchant trader. Jowitt’s tour through Elizabethan, Jacobean and Carolingian drama and literature makes this perfectly clear as she traces the ambiguity and mutability of representations of pirates. Sometimes they are villainous, sometimes heroic, but always complex. This is a valuable exercise in contextualisation, aimed directly against the eighteenth-century legacy of the pirate as *hostis humani generis*, a universal enemy of mankind. As a naval historian, Rodger’s ambition is also to contextualise piracy. Highlighting widespread definitional laxity on the part of his fellow historians is a way of attacking the common Weberian obsession with states, state-building, and national navies which simply reinforces a false, Manichean distinction between the outlawed pirate and the peaceful, legal merchant. It is indeed true that most historians are comfortable with an all too simple formula: there were pirates who were an abomination and firmly outside the law, privateers who were licensed by the state to

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conduct violence, and state-owned and run navies. Yet prior to the mid-seventeenth century, privateering in the form of commissions to attack named enemies of a state in times of war did not exist. Private violence at sea was a form of reprisal warfare, conducted and commissioned by a prince, at least notionally, to remedy a private injustice. Although it was done on an ever greater scale in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, to ignore the subtle difference, Rodger argues, is to risk overlooking the still essentially private and commercial nature of warfare at sea. The notion of ‘the state’ is, therefore, largely an anachronism the very use of which as a conceptual tool exaggerates the extent to which the pirate was a legal outsider. When Jowitt declares that her book ‘argues that Renaissance accounts of “pirates” show them as not always at odds with England’s international initiatives and activities, and [suggests] instead that they perform vital functions in the development of the nation’s role in the global economy’ (p. 8), she seems to be sharing common ground with Rodger.

Yet the similarities between Jowitt and Rodger appear to end there. For Rodger, it’s not just that pirates could at one and the same time be considered beyond the law and occasionally useful tools for English policy. Their violence was an everyday fact of life. The early modern world was one in which all traders were prepared to use violence, and those who might get labelled as pirates nevertheless necessarily participated in an economy with networks of commercial and even some legal and political support. Indeed Rodger directly criticises Jowitt, for her earlier work, in a way which perhaps illustrates the disciplinary difference between the historian and an historical literary critic. He accuses her, and others, of not recognising this mundane and pervasive reality of private commercial warfare and of ‘[preferring] to construct fantasies of pirates’ by imagining them to have revolutionary motives, raging against national and international political, economic, and cultural norms. Indeed in The Culture of Piracy, Jowitt claims, ‘it is important to consider the reasons for the widespread nature of Renaissance piracy. Is it a protest, a deliberate oppositional stance against a state or regime which they find unpalatable?’ In fact, she offers quite a convincing answer from the pen of a seventeenth-century observer. According to John Smith in his True Travels ... of 1630, it was simply a necessary reaction to harsh economic reality (p. 10). One suspects that Rodger would agree. Piracy was simply part of the normal state of commercial affairs and of endemic private commercial warfare.

Whilst it is true that historians have projected onto the world of pirates an extraordinary and confrontational agency that they did not have, to be fair to Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy is not a study of pirates themselves but of how they were represented as literary figures. And she reveals very effectively that it is not just modern historians who have manipulated the image of the pirate into a larger than life political challenge to the establishment; sometimes contemporary or near contemporary dramatists and writers did too. If this re-imagining of pirates was a fact of Elizabeth and Jacobean life then surely it must also be taken seriously by historians and not just left to literary scholars. In other words, if people at the time imagined pirates in radically different ways, it would be worth knowing how and why. For Jowitt, it is largely linked to the current political context of English imperial expansion. As she says, ‘England was attempting to increase and announce its presence within a global economy through a surge of new textual and actual activities’ and she highlights Richard Hakluyt’s work as an example of the former (p. 7). Yet it is possible to wonder for the latter if there is not some element of determinism at work. Of course there were ‘actual activities’ which spread English maritime strength and imperial reach, but the same spirit of determined historicising evident in Rodger’s anti-Weberianism does not seem to be reflected in Jowitt’s acceptance of what she calls England’s serious attempt ‘to establish express ambitions for an empire to rival that of Spain and Portugal in the West and the Ottomans in the East’ (p. 11). In this context, one of the benefits of the works of other historians, like, for example those of David Armitage, is that whilst these make clear that seafarers played a big role in developing the maritime identity of Britain

2 Ibid., p. 7.
and of its future imperial role, Elizabethan concepts of empire were conservative, continental, and inward-looking. Whatever dramatic, heroic stories of English strength of arms at sea emerged from this period, it is hard to extrapolate from them a serious, sustained attempt to rival Portugal or Spain.

There is a potential danger for Jowitt, therefore, of accepting a narrative of rising English imperial greatness, with piracy ‘used by Elizabeth proleptically as “the vanguard of the Empire”’ (p. 35). For example, the representation of the pirates Purser and Clinton, executed in 1583, reveals a certain ambiguity in the Elizabethan age. Though clearly presented as criminals, at their execution, Purser is first permitted to announce his value to the realm. The ‘faithlesse French’, he declares, will welcome his death for it leaves England without protection (p. 26). The same pirates appear in Jacobean drama, and Jowitt identifies a similar recognition of the pragmatic value of the pirates, but this time as a veiled critique of the reign of James I. ‘The celebration [of the pirate activities] as furthering the national interest – evident in the rewards bestowed (...) by the Queen at the end of the text (as she did with Drake on the quarterdeck of the The Golden Hind) might be seen as a plea for a less draconian and indiscriminate contemporary attitude to piracy’ (p. 34). The character of Elizabeth I is used here to celebrate nostalgically the role of the pirate, and such representations ‘implicitly challenge the [current] King’s authority and his policies in Europe’ (p. 36). James I, as Jowitt says, was much less tolerant of pirates than Elizabeth, preferring to pursue peaceful diplomatic and trade relations with other European powers. Thus a positive representation of pirates as brave and successful overseas, in many ways more successful than England itself, implies a critique of his policies. This is certainly plausible and interesting, yet one could be forgiven for wondering just how sharp the political barbs on such dramatic representations of pirates were. It seems as if this idea depends upon a presumed trajectory of natural national development based on seaborne violence and competitive imperial global reach animated by its champions through history and by the critics of those, like James I, who appear to deviate. If Rodger is correct that private commercial warfare was simply a fact of early modern economic life, then perhaps piracy’s political value as a literary device, as highlighted by Jovitt, is less obvious.

This is not to suggest that contemporary politics and culture did not affect representations of pirates, and Jowitt convincingly shows that indeed they did, as with treatments of Drake’s circumnavigation for example. Early ones, such as that by Richard Hakluyt the Younger in 1589, portray an active mercantile nationalism. Drake’s violence is treated ‘not as criminal activity, but as a standard aspect of early modern mercantile behaviour in disputed colonial regions’ (p. 49). Later, we are treated to a ‘gentlemen’s’ Drake, as he becomes a celebration of aristocratic values. The suggestion is that as ‘gentlemen’ increasingly invested in joint stock companies early in the seventeenth century ‘this alteration is reflected in the ideational values and rhetoric shaping descriptions of piracy’ (p. 50). Less contentious is the claim that texts were manipulated to show English seafarers in a positive light and to reinforce the dark legend of the Spanish. That is as one would expect it to be. Yet Jowitt’s analysis is consistently subtle and more complex than this, and the conclusions challenging. For anyone with an interest in early modern piracy or the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century generally, it is a rewarding and worthy read. It also serves, to those of us who do not study literary texts, as a further reminder of the value of interdisciplinarity in the study of history or at least of the many different perspectives on the past that are available.

Again, this is not a book about pirates or piracy. It is about the literary treatment of pirates which ‘shows how piracy is culturally produced and disseminated’ (p. 14). Whilst the interactions between contemporary politics and

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this public manipulation of the image of pirates in literature are very sensitively evoked, there is still a world of real life piracy left for the historian to research. One could even say that the culture of piracy, that is to say of the pirates themselves, remains largely untouched. Both N.A.M. Rodger and Claire Jowitt, each in a very different way, provide us with a valuable reminder that in doing so we must be alert to the use of language, of our own and that of early modern society, and to its relation to the law as it relates to these outsiders who played such a central cultural and political role.

Finally, there are a couple of unusual features of the book which are perhaps not even worth mentioning. When Jowitt’s pirates meet their sticky ends, they are inevitably ‘hung’. I was always taught that only pictures are hung; people are hanged. Perhaps that’s no longer the convention. More significantly, there is also at times a slightly laboured, self-conscious feel to the organisation of the argument which is not helped by the curious habit of occasionally writing in the first person and referring in the text to the title of the book. ‘For the rest of The Culture of Piracy, my emphasis will be on...’, for example (p. 79). Clumsy perhaps, inelegant certainly, but these are not hanging offences.

Alan James

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Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida, Žižek, Butler: there is a long list of politically-minded modern and postmodern thinkers – by no means limited to these – who have turned to Greek tragedy, and specifically Sophocles’ *Antigone*, in order to inform or illustrate their own ideas. Whilst Bonnie Honig’s *Antigone, Interrupted* is therefore striding into crowded and contested ground, it does so not without an attempt at self-justification. Honig follows Jacques Lacan’s suggestion as to why the play might continue to excite our curiosity two-and-a-half thousand years after its first performance: ‘even if [we] are not aware of it, the latent fundamental image of Antigone forms part of [our] morality’. If this is so, she argues, then ‘Sophocles’ heroine forms latently part of our politics as well… abandoning Antigone is not something we are simply free to do’ (pp. 36-37).

We are, then, bound to this story, and in ways we cannot ignore. It is therefore no surprise that Honig begins by stressing her method as a ‘dramaturgical approach’: if *Antigone* is as important as Honig claims it is, then it must come first; we must look from the play to politics, not the other way round. This does not immediately promise to open up the discursive space that Honig requires – how much can have been left unsaid about this two-and-a-half thousand year-old text, after all? – but Honig develops a radical re-reading that enables her to reach unapologetically different conclusions to those offered by many of her predecessors.

Starting with a critique of Judith Butler’s reading of the play, Honig emphasises the importance of what Butler describes as ‘precariousness’ to her own understanding of Sophocles’ heroine. For all *Antigone’s* fragility, however, Honig insists that this does not preclude her from aiming at that most unfashionable of values in critical thought: sovereignty. Following Butler – and J. Peter Euben – Honig notes that in her rhetoric against Creon, Antigone adopts his register. She is therefore not directly opposed to Creon in a struggle between two incommensurable and absolute conceptions of right, as Hegel claimed. Nor, however, is she bound to him as the agent that can fulfil her pre-existing death wish, *pae* Jacques Lacan. She is, rather, ‘a figure of both sovereignty and precariouslyness’ (p. 54).

This seems a dissonant combination, but Honig argues that such an analysis can help in the task of formulating what she terms ‘agonistic humanism’: a notion ‘that sees in mortality, suffering, sound, and vulnerability resources for some form of enacted if contestable universality, while also recognising these resources are variable and opaque in their significances, just like language’ (p. 19). Though Honig does not reference his work, agonistic humanism chimes with Michael Dillon’s insistence, following William Connolly, that the ontologically tragic nature of our social being requires the incorporation of agonism into our conception of democracy. The ‘Interrupted’ of Honig’s title therefore not only refers to the interruptions central to the text as she sees it, but also describes the book’s purpose: to disrupt conventional, dominant readings of the play, to draw attention to the contrary possibilities it presents, and to enact a discursive and practical agonism that can participate in some interruption of its own.

It is here that Honig’s reading takes a turn for the left-field. Moving away from Butler, who,

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Honig says, ‘sees Antigone as an isolated, lone, suffering heroine, opposed to her sister and seeking glory for herself’ (p. 55), Honig instead focuses on Antigone in a situated, social sense. Her Antigone is characterised not by solitary heroism, intransigence or inward psychological turmoil, but by solidarity, expressed in part by her paradoxical insistence on both the equality of all as well as the singularity of Polynices, her unburied dead brother (p. 123). In a neat rhetorical twist, Honig argues that an analysis of an independent Antigone, mourning alone and plotting transgressive burial – a ‘politics of lamentation’ – in fact has the potential to become ‘a lamentation of politics’. Solitary mourning rejects sovereignty; it withdraws, and in so doing cannot enact the ‘agonistic humanism’ Honig sees at the core of her project. Antigone must therefore be embedded within a broader social context, and Honig demonstrates this tragic solidarity with reference to Antigone’s relationship with her sister, Ismene (p. 154).

This is brave. Antigone and Ismene are not obviously in concert – indeed, Ismene outwardly refuses to help Antigone in her quest to bury her brother Polynices. Solidarity between the two sisters is a hidden thread of the text, and there is a reason why Hegel, Lacan and Butler all see Antigone as going it alone. However, Honig goes further than simply arguing on behalf of sororal camaraderie; she speculates that, despite her avowal not to help, Polynices’ first ‘burial’ might actually have been performed by Ismene in an expression of solidarity with her sister. This is a wildly ambitious reading of the text that has a number of pertinent and intriguing political implications; Honig’s subsequent discussion of forced choice and ethical agency is amongst the strongest sections of her book (pp. 177-181). However, for all this, it is not a hugely convincing piece of literary interpretation: it requires not only a speculative reading between the lines but also a fairly swift skim over some of the lines themselves (one thinks here of Ismene’s expression of horror at the thought of flouting Creon’s edict, for example). Honig does address these apparent dissonances, but this serves to make her reading appear rather convoluted and certainly wilful.

It is here that Honig’s ‘dramaturgical approach’ begins to unravel slightly. Reading Antigone, Interrupted one gets a sense that Honig is reinterpreting Sophocles in order to bear upon her own pre-formed political project as much as she is attempting to draw lessons from the play; that she is hammering Antigone into a shape of her own choosing. Despite these suspicions, however, Antigone, Interrupted remains representative of an ambitious and persuasive political project and an important addition to the growing body of political theory that uses Greek tragedy as a platform.

Alister Wedderburn

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Few issues in the social sciences are as fiercely contested as the concept of terrorism. Yet as academics consistently lament, rarely is the field of terrorism studies graced with original scholarship. *The Foundations of Modern Terrorism* by Martin A. Miller is a notable exception, providing an original and provocative study of the origins of terrorism as we know it today.

The main departure of Miller’s work from much of the terrorism literature is the focus on the reciprocal role of insurgents and the state in producing political violence, of which terrorism is a subset. The author acknowledges the bifurcation in how terrorism is typically conceptualised and studied. First, there is the popular concept of illegitimate political violence by subnational factions attempting to undermine governments, often through attacking civilians. Second, there is state terror usually associated with Robespierre, Stalin, Hitler et al. Miller instead combines the two, adopting a ‘revisionist position that integrates, rather than separates, the historical antagonists’, i.e. states and insurgents, and their reciprocal role in generating political violence.

The book appears to have two related elements, held together by a clear central thesis. The majority of the text is a history of political violence, with emphasis on the relationship between states and the insurgents who oppose them. This is brought to a head in the final chapter which applies the author’s central argument to terrorism as currently conceived. The argument itself is controversial but clear: that terrorism cannot function without the agentive role of states and insurgents, and that both are in some way responsible for it. Moreover, the contemporary concept of terrorism is but a recent phenomenon, and one that modern Western states have actually done much to create.

A welcome change from many works on terrorism is that the author explicitly avoids engaging in any detailed discussion of the hundreds of definitions of terrorism found in the literature. With countless reviews of the issue available, it is refreshing not to be forced into the same early chapter of seminal definitions and discussions which invariably concludes that terrorism is politically contested and there is no single definition that can be universally applied.

Instead, the author gets down to his conceptualisation of terrorism straight away and then moves directly on to the main argument. Miller defines terrorism as involving repeated acts of political violence that generate an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in civilian society. Similar to other authors, the issue that gives rise to terrorism is the contestation over the legitimacy of state power (p. 2). Miller characterises terrorism as involving violent combat between states and insurgents over unresolved political issues. These conceptualisations reflect the author’s focus: the antagonistic relationship between state and insurgent, both of which are integrally responsible for terrorism.

Miller’s concept of terrorism is necessarily broader than those of many other terrorism scholars. The result is a book that is more a general history of political violence rather than terrorism as tactically defined today. There are two advantages to this however. First, by arguing that both insurgents and states can employ terror, Miller maintains a modicum of
emotional neutrality on the issue of what is labelled as terrorism. Second, by focusing broadly on political violence, Miller situates modern terrorism in a far broader historical narrative going back to Biblical times. In doing so, the extensive if not predominant role of the state in perpetrating terror becomes apparent.

One of the overwhelming strengths of the book is its chronological breadth. From Aristotle to Al Zawahiri, Miller covers an impressive body of literature on the relationship between regimes and political violence. His argument qualifies terrorism as a particular form of political violence, and therefore one aspect of a phenomenon that has existed for millennia rather than centuries. Like any narrative, particularly one attempting to cover such a broad and varied topic, depth is sacrificed. Readers wishing to gain in-depth analysis of specific cases may find their treatment somewhat superficial, although this is acknowledged by the author himself. So impressive is the breadth of cases interwoven into the overall thesis, though, that this is a minor issue. Such cases are judiciously chosen, necessitated by the author’s attempt to demonstrate the interaction between state and insurgent terror in specific historical moments.

After briefly reviewing the history of political violence over the millennia, the author turns to his main narrative of ‘modern’ terrorism, which covers two hundred years, from the French Revolution to the end of the Cold War. The French Revolution represented ‘the watershed moment in which terrorism entered the politics of modern Europe’ (p. 2). This starting point differs from those proposed by authors who focus on terrorism as an illegitimate anti-state phenomenon, and who tend to credit nineteenth century Russian anarchists with the invention of terrorism as a tactic. The significance of the French Revolution was, according to Miller, that it altered notions of state legitimacy, specifically by reinforcing the right of citizens to rebel against oppressive governments by any available means. Thereafter, terrorism was ‘an evolving complex of in civilian forces zones of violent combat over control of state power between officials in government and insurgents in society’ (p. 3).

Miller’s narrative encompasses specific sections on terror in nineteenth century Europe, Russia and the USA. It follows on to examine the diverse ‘Terrors’ of the twentieth century, including the authoritarian terrors of communism and fascism, followed by specific examples of terror during the Cold War. A plethora of cases are examined, be they Russian anarchism, King Leopold’s Congo, the Algerian civil war or the apartheid regime in South Africa. The final chapter applies the overall thesis to present day ‘contemporary’ terrorism, concluding that political violence in both state and anti-state forms is as prevalent as ever.

Early in the book, the author rightly points out that terrorism is but ‘one of a number of genres of political violence, which also includes war, genocide and ethnic cleansing’ (p. 1). Nevertheless, the author often uses terrorism and political violence interchangeably. At times one is left with the impression that all forms of repression are in some way terroristic. While this is convincingly argued, it broadens the scope of terrorism beyond the many authors who view it as a specific tactic, as practised by figures such as Bakunin and Bin Laden.

A thought provoking aspect of Miller’s argument is that people within democratic states may be reluctant to accept that their governments may play a role in fostering the violence perpetrated against them. As Miller explains, the ‘official narrative’ after 9/11 was one of innocent America under attack from radical, destructive religious fanatics (p. 242). This narrative then justified the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as clampdowns on civil liberties such as the Patriot Act. The notion that US foreign policy in the Middle East had in any way contributed to Al Qaeda’s emergence was scarcely evident in post-9/11 Western political discourse.

To that end, a recurring theme of the book is that states may be reluctant to admit their own engagement in acts of terror, or their role as provocateurs in the very violence from which they are attempting to protect their citizens. Controversially, Miller defines both the American treatment of native American Indians and the lynching of African Americans as examples of state-sanctioned terrorism.
However, rarely have these aspects of American history been labelled as terrorism, even though terror more than adequately describes how Native Americans or African Americans must have felt at the time.

Miller’s critique of the contemporary concept of terrorism extends to both academic theory and liberal democracies themselves. He argues that in liberal democratic political discourse, terrorism is myopically viewed as an externally created phenomenon, in comparison to democracies that are inherently peaceful and non-violent. He is also critical of the state-centric approach of orthodox terrorism theory, in which state violence against opponents is legitimate and defensive while oppositional violence is automatically illegitimate. Instead, he argues that the forces that bring forth terrorism are ‘permanent features of modern nation states’, brought forth by both governments and their opponents (p. 254).

Citing casualty figures, Miller points out that states have been responsible for exponentially more deaths in the last century than those caused by insurgent terrorist groups. Miller’s statistics make states responsible for 179 million deaths in the twentieth century, not including the world wars, the Holocaust, Hiroshima or Nagasaki (p. 253). As he says, ‘every kind of government (not every government), whether authoritarian or democratic, has been complicit in terrorizing its own citizenry at some point in its history’ (p. 253). Indeed the author calls on nations to more honestly confront the atrocities they have committed in the past, rather than burying or sanitizing them.

Overall, The Foundations of Modern Terrorism is a thoughtful and compelling contribution to a body of literature so extensively researched and rehashed that it is often tough to find anything new. Those looking for immediate prescriptions on how to prevent radicalisation, or the tactical minutiae of current counter-terrorism policy may need to look elsewhere. Readers who see terrorism solely as the work of illegitimate non-state actors will find the analysis uncomfortable reading. However, those looking to contextualise modern terrorism historically, and sceptical of the rhetorical labelling of terrorists in contemporary political discourse, will find Miller’s work challenging and insightful. Whether one accepts the author’s argument or not, by encouraging deeper reflection on the role of the state in creating the permissive conditions for terrorism, the book makes a telling contribution.

Thomas Colley

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Have you ever wondered why Wallenstein has the dubious fame of being both the best and, despite his success, the last major individual military contractor? That contradiction was at the heart of the traditional story about mercenary armies reaching their peak and collapsing during the Thirty Year’s War. However, the war continued for almost 14 years after Wallenstein’s death, providing more work for mercenary soldiers and their commanders-contractors. *The Business of War* is written in sharp defiance of old biases against ‘soldiers of Fortune’ and treats mercenaries not as a temporary lesser evil but as the most natural and efficient way of European warfare for many centuries from hallowed antiquity to the end of the *Ancien Régime* in the fires of the French Revolution.

The theme is far from being worn out. Military contractors and mercenaries were inevitably touched upon by every work that examined warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but there were few focused studies since Fritz Redlich’s *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force*. For more than half a century this was the prime source for details of the costs, mechanisms and hazards of hiring ‘dogs of war’ in early modern Europe. Now it is evident that *The Business of War* will become our new reference point. However, this book is something more than a summary of recent research on the subject. This is the first major study that is free from old prejudices and examines facts at their face value.

Greater attention is given to the golden age of military contracting in 1500-1648. The subtitle ‘Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe’ is deceivingly narrow. The book’s focus is not on military enterprising *per se* but on the complex relationship between mercenary networks and the power of the state. Enterprise itself is understood here in a wider sense than just procurement of soldiers: it expands to delegation of responsibility for supply of food and clothes as well as for manufacturing munitions and weapons.

Many historians previously tended to treat mercenaries as an unreliable and incapable force, a deviation from the norms of warfare; eventually their greed had to make way for permanent state armies, centralised recruitment, and authority of the now evolved modern state. What part of that paradigm was based on facts? It was obviously brewed on a moral view which despised fighting for profit as well as on state propaganda of massed recruitment, without any solid evidence to speak of. The general disapproval of mercenaries was an axiom, not a proven theory. As Parrott correctly notes, ‘no amount of contrary evidence about the fighting commitment and effectiveness of mercenaries in particular military circumstances will change what seems, from one perspective, a set of logical assumptions about their limitations as military operators’. This is perhaps no surprise: we all remember the frank words of Max Planck that ‘a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it’.

Parrott argues here that not only were mercenaries and contractors highly efficient in waging war, but also that private and public forms of warfare were not zero sum antagonists. The growth of state power didn’t bring about the death of private military enterprise. Maintenance of state-recruited and state-administered military force is seen here as
an anomalous development over the broader course of European history, a temporary drive towards mass-conscripted armies that started roughly in the 1760s and ended in the 1960s. In contrast, from the Greek city-state through to the *Ancien Régime* of the eighteenth century private-public partnership flourished. That fact is relevant once again in our times with the rise of private ‘security companies’ like the infamous Blackwater (now renamed as Academi) and their more discreet colleagues.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to the emergence and the evolution of military enterprise until the end of the Thirty Years’ War. The author describes different forms of military enterprise, their evolution and adaptability as well as the reasons for the failure of alternatives to it. The most important conclusion here is that ‘there was no single model for army organisation in that period; still less was there any inexorable process towards a state-run, state-controlled army’ (p. 135).

The second part looks into the bowels of military enterprise. It shows how efficient privatised warfare could be, how close it came to ordinary business, with known risks and returns of investments. In contrast to the usual tactical analysis of battles or a strategic one of whole wars, Parrott has focused on the day-to-day operational planning and decision making that occurred on campaigns. This is the strongest part of the book because it uncovers details of the inner cogs of mercenary networks.

There is a meaningful analysis of the grand game played by generals equally proficient. It was played for so long not because their armies were ineffective but on the contrary because they were very capable at destroying the enemy while very expensive and fragile themselves - and the enemy was the same. The armies of military enterprisers prevailed over the predominantly state-controlled armies of the period not only because they performed well on the battlefield. More important was the efficiency of complex private systems for attracting veteran soldiers and accumulating money, food, weapons and other resources.

‘Far from being a marginal and transient phenomenon in the history of European warfare, it was a lasting and successful set of mechanisms which, in various relations with rulers and their authority, lay at the heart of war-waging for centuries’ (p. 208).

The evidence backing the author’s arguments is rich and compelling. However, the main strength of this book is not in the wealth of the primary sources used, but in their interpretation. The book is very stimulating because many facts get here a proper explanation. It is very refreshing to see a book about early modern mercenaries without negative bias and one cannot help but remember Michael Mallett’s famous book, *Mercenaries and their Masters*, which accorded the same justice to the Italian condottieri. After all, wars are instruments of privatising profits and nationalising losses, so to deny the common soldier’s right to fight for profit after allowing for the same motivation for elites and states might seem hypocritical.

The issue, however, is far from settled. Now the arguments of this book need to pass the test of subsequent scholarship. The true discussion is just beginning, as the theories challenged by *The Business of War* were actually superficial suppositions, not to say myths. From a purely logical point of view, it is very easy to prove the errors of simplistic theories by presenting evidence of complexity. If previous authors described a linear evolution of military forces from unruly landsknechts to disciplined Dutch and Swedish national armies, then to standing armies, then to mass conscripted armies, it is enough to show that mercenaries were no less committed to victory than patriotic recruits, that a mercenary army could exist in different forms, that Dutch and Swedish armies employed 50-90% of foreign mercenaries and so on. If previous authors conjured the image of a fiscal-military state and spoke of the inevitable growth of the state’s monopoly on violence and coercion, it is enough to show that different states developed via different paths and that without compromise with local powers early modern

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states ‘failed to achieve more than a fraction of their declared objectives’ (p. 311).

The place of *The Business of War* in the Military Revolution debate is not easy to describe. On the one hand, it is arguing against the patterns of state and army growth laid down as fundamental by Michael Roberts. On the other hand, the book exists in a parallel world where Military Revolution gets only a minor reference, because the author’s focus on facts leaves no room for theories that lack equally solid evidence. As Parrott admits, Roberts was far more measured in his assessments than his successors, but overall ‘the argument for transformation of the battlefield through tactical and organisational innovations had always owed more to a priori claims of reformers than to empirical validation through events on the battlefield. There was nothing especially distinctive, let alone revolutionary’ in most changes that were praised under the fashionable name of the ‘Military Revolution’ (p. 145). However, what can we put in the place of the Military Revolution? Until now no one has managed to forge new evidence into a clear and convincing general concept of what had actually happened in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This work is no exception.

The book shines especially bright through the argument presented from a fresh perspective, that is less through attacking previous assumptions, but more through the examination of military enterprise in the context of credits to the sovereigns. In recent years several works have appeared which analyse credit systems at the top level, that is direct borrowing by rulers from banking networks. Here we find out about the middle level of credit. Throughout Europe in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries different incentives, be they social prestige, allocation of taxes or the potential for plunder, were used in order to lessen or to postpone royal expenses for the creation and supply of armies. That credit is more important for understanding the nature of the early modern state, than the state’s borrowing from bankers, because it demonstrates once again that historians previously overestimated the growth of state power. The successful waging of wars required a great deal of agreement over mutual benefits. Both coercion and financial resources were much more limited than was previously supposed, so rulers had to present clear rewards for wide social groups in order to obtain the required size of armed forces.

If there is a minor point of critique, it lies in the area of format, not content. There is so much that is new and interesting here that it sometimes gets squeezed into sentences spanning over half a page or into paragraphs two pages long. The style is far from clear and readable. It is too dry to be a pleasure to read and one should expect painful work ahead as one attempts to untangle these condensed treasures, content that could fill not one but three books. The structure of the book leaves something to be desired. A thematic structure based on primary arguments would be more intuitive. As it is, there is no evident designing principle for the chosen division, which is partly chronological, partly thematic. There is no obvious finite idea for chapters and their titles are vague. The same arguments are repeated and reinforced in different places. Some weeks after finishing the book a reader can have trouble finding a particular fact. One would, for example, expect to find the etymology of the word ‘soldier’ in the initial overview and discussion of terms. It is, however, located in the second part ‘Operations and Structures’, in the chapter ‘The Military Contractor at War’ and its section ‘Operational Effectiveness’. The index is very helpful, but it would be better to see in each section only interconnected facts that prove its main idea. But the reader who will overcome such obstacles will be most richly rewarded.

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