- Norway, Britain and the Arctic Convoys to the USSR
- The Transatlantic Alliance: Deeper, then Widen
- Comic Book Representations of the Holocaust
- Review: The Road to Rocroi
- American Cinema and Conflict
- Private Military Security Contractors
November was supposed to be a triumphant month for the West. The European Union’s (EU) Eastern Partnership, a Poland and Sweden-founded, Eastern-EU led program aimed at expanding liberal democratic values among the EU’s eastern neighbours, had led the EU to the precipice of signing an unprecedented Association Agreement with Ukraine that would have likely paved the way for its eventual EU accession.

The West had been courting Ukraine to join the two foundational transatlantic institutions for many years, including in one post-Orange Revolution attempt that also came somewhat close to reaching an accord that would allow Ukraine to eventually join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This was all despite Russia – whose gas and oil pipelines (by most measures the main conduits of Russian power) mostly run through Ukraine, which maintains close links to the pro-Russian faction of Ukraine that elected current President Viktor Yanukovich, whose Black Sea Fleet is still stationed on the Crimean Peninsula, and, perhaps most importantly, whose civilization has its origins in Kiev – which promised dire consequences for any Ukrainian move to strengthen relations with the EU.

Nevertheless, after the EU cleared the final hurdle in the negotiations by agreeing among its members to postpone demands that Ukraine release former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko from prison, the EU readied to defy the odds in Vilnius, where EU leaders and President Yanukovich would sign into effect one of the biggest shifts in post-Soviet European history. Then, one week before the November summit, Yanukovich abruptly turned the other way.

Since then, a brave protest movement has gripped several Ukrainian cities, a movement which has withstood apparent police brutality and bitter cold temperatures, and EU negotiations continue with Georgia and Moldova. Despite these encouraging developments, the November episode surely ranks among the most disappointing in the history of the ‘transatlantic alliance’, the post-Second World War bloc of (mostly) liberal democracies manifested in NATO and the EU. Yet, so far, observers have paid little attention to the context of Yanukovich’s about-face in the history of the transatlantic institutions. While they rapidly expanded in the immediate post-Cold War period as former Warsaw Pact states sought security assurances to secure the development of independent, liberal polities, the transatlantic alliance has seen its share of difficulties, some of the more recent ones stemming from the institutions’ newer members.

Indeed, through their histories, the two most common refrains about these institutions have been, first, that they are in crisis and, second, that they are consolidated by common values. Re the former, while I need not remind the reader of the apparently-existential ‘Euro crisis’, only three years ago – amid the Libya campaign that helped oust Moammar Ghaddafi – did U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warn of NATO becoming a hollow ‘two-tiered alliance’, with one ally capable of bona fide military endeavour, Canada, and a continent of free-riders. The campaign required far-reaching American support to what was supposed to be a modest and mostly European operation and, coinciding with the beginning of the global austerity craze, it elicited bipartisan American ire. Now, only three years after many raised the prospect of NATO’s de facto demise, this controversy has disappeared from

1 Zachary Ginsburg graduated with Distinction from the MA programme in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London. His MA dissertation, exploring NATO’s endurance and International Relations theory is available online for download at http://www.academia.edu/attachments/31812849/download file.


3 We are referring here to the 2008 Bucharest Summit, wherein Ukraine was not granted a ‘Membership Action Plan’.

4 Though Russia is constructing the ‘South Stream’ pipeline through the Black Sea in order to gain assurances against Ukrainian actions that could affect Moscow’s abilities to use the gas flows to its maximal advantage.

5 ‘Parliamentary Chaos as Ukraine Ratifies Fleet Deal,’ BBC News (27 April 2010).

6 Where she is being held under what the EU has rather kindly labeled ‘selective justice’.


public consciousness entirely; yet, almost nothing changed save that aforementioned ‘free-riders’ almost certainly contribute less today than when Gates made his speech.\(^9\) Some might reasonably ask: if crises arise so frequently in NATO that they slip from memory still unresolved in less than three years, how can the alliance remain functional while adding even more members?

Gates’ genuine alarm over the state of NATO was not unprecedented. Pessimism over the future of NATO spans back nearly to the alliance’s 1949 founding, and it has sometimes matched EU pessimism even at the height of the ‘Euro crisis’. Indeed, while the EU\(^10\) seems to be slowly exiting its first major ‘crisis’, NATO has faced down so many that the most comprehensive study of NATO studies calls such claims ‘cliché’.\(^11\) Enter the second refrain of the transatlantic institutions: NATO and the EU are consolidated by shared values, norms, ideologies and identities. Arising in the early 90s due to NATO’s Cold War transcendence, the second refrain is a response to the first. It purports to explain how transatlantic integrations, namely NATO, might endure or actually deepen even when this would seem to contradict Western states’ strategic self-interests.


\(^10\) As in the proper use of that term: the international entity created by the 1992 Treaty on European Union, or ‘Maastricht Treaty’.

\(^11\) Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Some examples from my 2011 Masters dissertation: ‘The Atlantic alliance, which has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy during three administrations, has begun to founder under the impact of Europe’s new nationalism and the apparent decline of the Russian military threat’ (Ronald Steel in *The End of an Alliance*, 1964); ‘Nuclear weapons have made nonsense of the whole alliance business’ (James Avery Joyce, 1968); ‘NATO and the Warsaw Pact [would] dissolve [in the event of the Cold War’s end]; they may persist on paper, but each [will cease] to function as an alliance,’ (John Mearsheimer’s ‘Back to the Future’ in Summer 1990’s International Security, which also predicted European ‘hyper-balkanization.’ U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany, and World War III); ‘But we must wonder how long NATO will last as an effective organization. As is often said, organizations are created by their enemies. Alliances are organized against a perceived threat. We know from balance-of-power theory as well as from history that war-winning coalitions collapse on the Morrow of victory, the more surely if it is a decisive one,’ (Kenneth Waltz, 1993).

It corresponds with the rise of International Relations constructivism\(^12\), which became an alternative orthodoxy to neo-realism\(^13\) following the latter’s failure to predict the Cold War’s end and the events surrounding it. Whereas neo-realism is a structuralist and rationalist theory that predicts that states will band together in power-balancing dyads due to the inherent instability of the ‘international system,’ constructivism (with a few notable exceptions) predicts that states with like-minded populaces – with shared values, similar cultures, familiarities built by overlapping histories, etc. – will form transnational associations, driving closer political integration and even friendship. Western states, with their shared political and cultural traditions, provided fruitful case studies for constructivists, particularly NATO and the EU. According to constructivists and the organizations themselves, liberal democracy – a concept almost ubiquitous in the transatlantic area and a foundation of modern concepts of justice around the world – is the most important of such traditions.

If, as most constructivists believe, liberal democracy is the primary glue that holds transatlantic institutions together, one might see a silver lining in the November setback to integrate Ukraine – with its former Prime Minister still in prison and its other undelivered promises on human rights and democratization – into the transatlantic alliance. This year has already seen a dangerous trend in the state of transatlantic democracy: The rise of major, majoritarian political movements in EU and NATO states, particularly Turkey, Hungary, and Greece. While the year has also seen its share of other political tension (such as the Snowden affair), majoritarianism is fundamentally more threatening toward NATO and the EU, as, according to the constructivist rationale, it challenges their very *raisons d’etre*. Crucially as well, member-states in NATO and the EU can also partake in ‘hostage taking’ due to member-states’ extensive veto capacities in both institutions.

This essay will focus on Turkey, Hungary, Greece, and Ukraine as case studies as to why the

\(^12\) As in the International Relations’ theory.

\(^13\) And probably the most popular framework for scholars who study those organizations themselves.
transatlantic alliance might consider institutional reforms and perhaps even more stringent membership or association criteria. While much of the particular episodes surrounding these states have either fizzled or have been ameliorated in some way, member-states’ reactions to each could still produce damaging externalities. On one hand, weak action could threaten Brussels’ legitimacy by showing that the organizations will tacitly accept anti-liberal behaviour among member-states when contravening would threaten other objectives. On the other, overbearing action could render them ineffective by creating a ‘Trojan Horse’ scenario via an ideological/political stalemate where nothing is able to pass a body where all members have veto power, something akin to the United Nations Security Council during the Cold War.

While Eastern Partnership states currently under consideration for EU Association Agreements have made much progress toward meeting the EU’s acquis communautaire in the areas of democracy and governance, they have not done so completely, and recent history shows the danger of admitting states into organizations, particularly the EU, when they do not fully meet the membership criteria. Section one discusses liberal democracy’s meaning to NATO and the EU according to International Relations literature. Section two documents current and historical non-democratic EU member-states and strategic partners. Section three discusses the effects of non-liberal democratic member-states and partners. Section four concludes and advocates for structural changes in NATO and the EU. This essay concludes that structural reforms are necessary to ensure the longevity of the transatlantic alliance’s internal cohesion.

**Liberal Democracy in International Relations: From Epiphenomenal to Fundamental**

Since the Cold War, constructivism has displaced neo-realism as the predominant theory of NATO and EU studies largely because of constructivism’s ability to view ideologies like liberal democracy as impetuses for action, paradigms to interpret the material world, and paradigms to interpret others’ actions and communication. According to Alexander Wendt, who is often described as constructivism’s foremost theorist, constructivism is properly understood as a method by which the material and ideological can be analytically interpreted. However, constructivism has proceeded with a marked bias toward ideological explanation. This is understandable in the context of ‘ideal-type debates.’

Necessarily, constructivism has incorporated sub-state units like private corporations, government bureaucracies, and civil society in its study of transatlantic integration because these entities can associate (relatively) freely across borders unlike, say, those in the former USSR. Culture (including politics) and its institutions matter for constructivists because they are part of the dialectics that determine how national actors interpret and execute action. In Wendt’s constructivism, ideologies are the dominant powers of ‘international society’ in highly-civilized world order, or ‘the Kantian sphere;’ however, ideologies are supplanted by existential considerations in ‘the Hobbesian sphere,’ wherein states view each other as ‘enemies’ as in classical realism, and in ‘the Lockean sphere,’ the most

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14 Indeed, the International Studies Association named his *Social Theory of International Politics* the ‘Book of the Decade’.


18 In IR, this means that the state is considered as a complete ‘unit’. Civil society, government bureaucracies, private corporations, and other ‘sub-state’ entities are ignored.
closely associated with structuralism wherein states view each other as potential ‘rivals’. Though Wendt is describing (problematically) ‘international anarchy’ itself and not international associations that exist within it, constructivists should describe NATO and the EU as best captured in a ‘Kantian’ tradition.\footnote{Alexander Wendt, \emph{Social Theory of International Politics} (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 6.}

Constructivist literature on NATO’s cohesion portrays an alliance coalesced by values since its inception, liberal democracy the most prominent among them. Besides that the North Atlantic Treaty’s preamble highlights liberal democratic values and that Article II calls for ‘strengthening member-states’ free institutions’,\footnote{North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Article II.} constructivists demonstrate that NATO has often pulled itself from internal crises by uniting around its common values. In at least three instances – the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1966 French withdrawal from integrated military command, and the Soviet dissolution – constructivists note that the alliance specifically called upon its values to bring it back from brink. Thomas Risse dedicates a chapter in his 1995 \emph{Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy} to the ‘Three Wise Men’ solution to the Suez Crisis, in which France, the United Kingdom, and Israel invaded Egypt to recapture the Suez Canal nationalized by Nasser after a joint campaign to mislead Washington about the imminent invasion.\footnote{Ryan C. Hendrickson ‘The Miscalculation of NATO’s Invasion’, Parameters, vol. 47, No 1 (2007), pp. 98-115.} ‘The Three Wise Men’ called for greater ‘political’ and even ‘cultural co-operation’ in the ‘Atlantic Community’.\footnote{Report of the Committee of Three (1956).} Following the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command,\footnote{This, most simply put, was caused by the confluence of Gaulism and détente.} Andreas Wenger (2007) writes that the solution was ‘the multilateralization of détente’, wherein the Johnson Administration and NATO’s military and political leadership, rather than trying to order the alliance top-down, allowed member-states to make NATO a ‘clearing house’ for common ideas on transatlantic order in the so-called ‘Harmel Exercise’.\footnote{Rapport du Rapporteur du Sous-Groupe 2 (1967).} Finally, Frank Schimmelfennig (1999) writes that member-states’ desire to further a liberal democratic world order after the Soviet dissolution not only kept the alliance alive after, but enabled it to expand. While I do not have room here to conduct a complete literature review on constructivist explanations on NATO’s endurance, it suffices to say that constructivists see member-states’ common values as foundational, and liberal democracy as their most foundational.\footnote{Zachary Ginsburg, ‘Eppur Si Muove: Toward an Integrative Theory of NATO’, King’s College London, MA War Studies Dissertation, ch. 3, online at \url{http://www.scribd.com/doc/130154100/Eppur-Si-Muove-Toward-an-Integrative-Theory-of-NATO}.}

Constructivist work on the EU, as one might expect, is more extensive. While a constructivist analysis of EU internal cohesion like the one above is made more difficult by the Union and its predecessors\footnote{Beginning with the 1954 European Coal and Steel Community.} many permutations, constructivist analyses of the Union since the Maastricht Treaty that created the modern EU are sufficiently numerous and diverse that Checkel (2007) cleaves them into three schools:\footnote{J.T. Checkel, ‘Constructivism and EU politics’ in \emph{Handbook of European Union Politics} (London: Sage, 2007).} ‘conventional’, ‘interpretive’, and ‘critical/radical’. Norms are essential in all three in different ways; in the first, ideologies provide a ‘value-rational’ basis for cooperation, while in the latter two, they constitute part of a regional identity reconstructed on European values.\footnote{Per Checkel (ibid), the difference between the second and third is that ‘critical/radical constructivists maintain the linguistic focus, but add an explicitly normative dimension by probing a researcher’s own implication in the reproduction of the identities and world he/she is studying.’} In short, while many scholars and observers have questioned how norms and values interact in and with the EU, few question their centrality.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[26] Zachary Ginsburg, ‘Eppur Si Muove: Toward an Integrative Theory of NATO’.
  \item[27] Zachary Ginsburg, ‘Eppur Si Muove: Toward an Integrative Theory of NATO’.
  \item[28] Zachary Ginsburg, ‘Eppur Si Muove: Toward an Integrative Theory of NATO’.
  \item[29] Zachary Ginsburg, ‘Eppur Si Muove: Toward an Integrative Theory of NATO’.
\end{itemize}
Democratic Deficits in the Transatlantic Area, Past and Present

While constructivists, policymakers, and others often assert the cohesive power of liberal democracy for NATO and the EU, they commonly overlook that not all member-states have shared these values – or at least in the governance of their own societies. Without any controversy whatsoever, one can name two NATO member-states that were categorically nondemocratic in the alliance’s early days: 1) Portugal, a founding member, ruled by a quasi-fascist authoritarian government until the 1974 ‘Carnation Revolution’; and 2) Greece, ruled by a military junta from 1967 to the 1974 Metapolitefsi. NATO also maintained defence integration with Spain from 1953, then under Franco, until its eventual full-membership under a delicate democracy in 1981. Often forgotten as well, NATO’s member-states, during most of their histories, ruled over territories as colonial overlords, including without controversy the United Kingdom, Portugal, France, and Belgium; the United States, in the earlier years of NATO, permitted legal segregation based on race, including significant barriers to political enfranchisement; and, Albania, one NATO’s newest member-states, continues to receive some of the lowest scores in international democracy indices in Europe, sometimes behind only authoritarian Belarus.

While it would have seemed that such anti-liberalism belonged to a bygone era, current events threaten to reverse this trend. At least two NATO member-states – Hungary and Turkey – and one EU member-state, Hungary, have this year engaged in explicitly anti-liberal and/or undemocratic practices. In Hungary, the ruling far-right/far-far-right coalition has attempted to neuter the constitutional court, paid tribute to Hungarian allies of Hitler, and punished dissenting intellectuals with bans from public funding. This year, a member of ‘Jobbik’, the quasi-neo-Nazi party that comprises the right-wing of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government, publicly called for a national registry of Jews, attacks against Roma go seemingly uninvestigated, and last year’s constitutional amendments even removed ‘Republic’ from the country’s official title.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s Taksim Square protests became a global discussion following the Erdoğan administration’s brutal crackdown, which has included rampant police brutality, arrests of lawyers and medics treating protestors, and petulant retorts to international condemnation. (Turkey before the crackdown was already the world-leader in jailing journalists). Recently, the European Council delayed Turkey’s EU accession talks for four months following pressure from Berlin, but even setting aside the Cyprus dilemma and other barriers to membership, it is difficult to see how member-states could accept an Erdoğan-led government any time soon following

30 Spain had suffered a coup attempt earlier that year.
34 Ibid., Kirchick (2012)
35 Ibid.
36 Ellis, ‘Hungary’.
39 Ibid.
41 ‘Germany Seeks to Put Turkey’s EU Membership Talks on Hold,’ EurActiv (June 2013), ‘On Heels Of Protest Crackdown, EU Delays Turkey Membership Talks,’ International Business Times (June 2013).
42 We mean here the diplomatic struggle over Cyprus between perennial rivals Greece and Turkey. Greece, an EU member-state, has veto power over candidate countries’ bids for membership. (Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since 1999). Turkey, meanwhile, has vetoed any NATO relations with Cyprus, creating a ‘hostage game’ between the two organizations.
recent events. Turkey has been, however, a member of NATO since 1952, and the alliance recently deployed Patriot missile-interceptors to Turkey’s southern border to help insulate it from the Syrian civil war.  

Perhaps equally worrying is the situation in Greece, where the fascist Golden Dawn movement controls eighteen seats in the Greek Parliament (though this is less than in the last set of parliamentary elections) and apparently the streets in several Athens neighbourhoods. Though the Golden Dawn is a fringe party, many have drawn allusions to the genus of fascism in intra-War Europe. In Germany, for instance, Nazi party leaders also exploited a ruinously bad economy by making scapegoats of the political, ethnic, and other minorities. Soon after, they quickly rose to power and declared a state of emergency that suspended democracy, paving the way for their infamous crimes. While the Greek economy is probably better than that of intra-War Germany, the resemblance to the situation that gave rise to the Nazi party is certainly troubling, and if – though it seems unlikely unless a new economic crisis were to arise – the Golden Dawn were to control Greece’s representation to NATO or the EU, the repercussions would certainly be dire if the organizations were unable to suspend or terminate Greece’s participatory competencies.

‘Trojan Horse’ Danger

While the new rise of majoritarianism in the transatlantic area should constitute a doomsday scenario for the organizations according to most constructivism, constructivism’s emphasis on liberal democracy has obfuscated organizational aspects that should allow NATO and the EU to survive even following a breakdown over ideology. Alternative logics of cooperation would still keep the organizations together either nominally or in pursuit of some sort of rational self-interest. For example, my 2011 dissertation finds four modes of interaction in NATO’s then-62 year existence: 1) balance-of-power (against external enemies as predicted by neo-realists); 2) institutionalized interests; 3) inculcated alienation (the corollary to liberal constructivism, in which culture and history drive erstwhile cooperators apart); 4) and normative consolidation (i.e. that which is the subject of this essay). While a breakdown of ‘normative consolidation’ has slowed the tempo of NATO cooperation from time to time, it has never convinced states to quit the alliance entirely. This likely owes to two reasons: First, the diplomatic and real capital costs of quitting NATO and re-nationalizing security capacities would be huge for almost any of its members. Second, NATO’s cultural interaction as in the ‘inculcated alienation’ and the ‘normative consolidation’ modes has ebbed and flowed, but ‘real security threats’ usually steer member-states away from ordinary politics. For example, the Korean War stirred fear of marching global communism, helping assuage impasses to create NATO’s modern military structure, and NATO largely stayed out of the Russo-Georgian War, declining to come to the aid of a democratic ally – one even considered a candidate for NATO enlargement in 2008 – due to its more fundamental interests viz. Moscow. Present foreign powers may not be compelling enough to consolidate a Waltzian ‘alliance through fear’, but NATO’s recent moves to combat terrorism and piracy inter alia demonstrate the alliance’s ‘securitizing’ of ‘non-traditional’ types of threats.

While these are two compelling reasons for NATO’s long-term endurance, the EU is an even more convincing case for both. On the first, the cost of EU ‘disentrenchment’ are even higher than those that would be associated with NATO withdrawal. While perhaps highly-indebted economies like that of Greece should be allowed

43 NATO: ‘NATO Support to Turkey’ (2013)  
44 Out of 300.  
47 Which, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, had no international institutions or fellow countries coming to its aid.

48 I call these ‘institutional costs’ in my dissertation.  
49 Ole Waever, Securitization and Desecuritization (Kbh.: Center for Freds- og Konfliktforskning, 1993).  
50 Ginsburg, ‘Eppur Si Muove’
to leave the Eurozone, the costs of Greece, for instance, leaving the EU entirely would probably include the periodic German bailouts that have kept its economy afloat as well as structural funds and much more. Any EU quitter would also find its diplomatic capital across Europe – excepting Moscow and its allies – severely diminished and, if the State Department’s message to Prime Minister Cameron on his anti-EU proposals is any indicator, their diplomatic capital in Washington as well.51

This should not be seen as evidence that fundamental disparities in political principles in the transatlantic area will not have consequences for the EU or NATO. Far from the contrary, majoritarianism could direly threaten their credibility and efficacy even if they do not do so existentially. First, it may threaten the organizations’ abilities to conduct business because of member-states’ veto capacities. While the rise of the European majoritarians does not necessarily mean that they will use their veto powers excessively in international assemblies against liberal democracies, those pushing such movements, notably populist, reactionary political parties, are predominately anti-American and -EU. Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán, for example, has publically compared the EU to the Soviet Union.52 Hungary’s Parliament has been equally combative toward Brussels, railing against the EU’s supposed colonial intents even following rather tepid criticism European Parliament, which opted to adopt a report criticizing Hungary’s constitutional changes rather than pass a resolution doing the same.53 In an escalation, Hungary could do damage appealing to domestic constituents by playing David to Brussels’ Goliath. It could sow discord among EU institutions, continue to flaunt the fundamental values set forth in the ‘Copenhagen criteria,’54 and effectively halt any fundamental changes to the EU by vetoing any new treaties unless other member-states were able to suspend Hungary’s voting privileges under the Maastricht Treaty’s Article VII (which would require broad consultation among European institutions and Hungary’s civil society and a qualified-majority vote from the European Council).55 Perhaps worse yet, NATO – which has no formal mechanism to suspend memberships or voting privileges – could become a hostage-by-proxy. NATO, whose North Atlantic Council passes motions only by unanimous decision, would be rendered ineffective to make any major decisions, including any emergency actions under the Article V ‘self-defense’ clause.

Second, the rise of new European majoritarianism could threaten NATO and the EUs’ credibility on issues such as democracy and human rights. While central parts of these organizations’ raisons d’etre, potential new members such as Ukraine may not interpret liberal democracy as prerequisite to transatlantic integration if existing member-states do not appear to take their own espoused principles seriously. Moreover, organizations like NATO have a credibility problem in criticizing, for example, the Putin regime’s silencing of free media when Turkey jails more journalists every year than any other country in the world.56 Even if a Brussels-led intervention via NATO or even greater EU oversight over member-states wouldn’t produce results, it would still demonstrate their commitments to their own principles.

Ensuring NATO and the EUs’ Efficacies

The EU and NATO’s organization around principles of liberal democracy are clearly inherent in their internal logic and their abilities to wield regional and global influence. The majoritarian member-states do not set good examples for new potential member-states to one or both organizations such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania. The EU particularly has seen the dangers of admitting member-states who cannot meet key sections of the acquis communautaire in the recent Euro crisis, and admitting states who would

54 Those required to enter the EU. See Bremmer (2010)
55 I.e. a majority of points from the Council’s weighted voting system, which is somewhat but not completely correlated to national population (‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based’ (2003)).
56 Committee to Protect Journalists (2012), Reporters without Borders (2012).
add to the organizations’ democratic deficits could increase the danger of legislative hostage taking that is already present, partially demonstrated by the recent episodes in Hungary, Turkey, and Greece.

Ukraine is an example of the potential for such danger. Much as long-established EU member-states courted some of the newer ones by easing entry criteria relating to economies, the EU evidently offered similar flexibility to Ukraine regarding democracy and the rule of law. Specifically, the EU first demanded that former Prime Minister Tymoshenko be released from prison as a precondition to the Association Agreement, then, facing resistance from President Yanukovich, the EU negotiators claimed that the EU would accept an amnesty for Tymoshenko that would allow her to exit Ukraine on humanitarian grounds and extended the timeline for negotiations, and finally, the EU negotiators apparently dropped all preconditions relating to Tymoshenko when it appeared that Yanukovich might walk from the deal. While Estonian President Anders Ansip commented that the fate of the negotiations should not be decided ‘by the fate of one woman,’ Tymoshenko’s continued imprisonment is indicative of a broader state of affairs in Ukraine. As evidenced even by the treatment of protestors this week in Kiev, Ukraine would have much ground to make up during any Association Agreement. While these Agreements should be designed as the first incentives to move candidate member-states toward transatlantic norms, the existing EU member-states would have to be patient in ensuring that Ukraine actually does meet the standards set forth in the *acquis communautaire* relating to the rule of law and democracy. Else, the EU could inadvertently admit a member-state that does not share fundamental values, or even worse yet, Ukraine could disastrously turn toward Russia as an EU member-state, enabling Moscow to use Ukraine as a proxy to wreak havoc in Brussels.

It is equally crucial, however, that the transatlantic alliance continues to engage its neighbours with constructive dialogue and incentives, including the potential for membership in the transatlantic institutions. The EU and NATO should be willing to accept states that do not fully meet membership criteria into pre-membership arrangements such as the Association Agreements and NATO’s Membership Action Plans. More importantly, however, considering the dangers posed by individual member-states’ veto powers in these increasingly large institutions, NATO and the EU should be transformed into true international democratic bodies, wherein a small minority cannot override the will of the vast majority when that majority is acting in accordance with the fundamental rules of the institutions. Much of the potential danger posed by democratic backsliding or admitting new member-states such as Ukraine could be greatly mitigated by reducing veto powers in the European and North Atlantic Councils and other EU and NATO entities, perhaps by adding a supermajority veto override or some similar measure. While this may seem a modest proposal, it would in effect be one of the most radical challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty even considering the EU’s recent history, as, in the case of the EU, it would permit a supermajority of member-states to alter treaties without the consent sovereign states that have signed them. A more feasible option to this supernational construction may be simply to be more careful in ensuring that entrants into NATO and the EU in fact meet their membership criteria.

Returning to International Relations theory, while constructivism may create the false impression that only liberal values coalesce NATO and the EU, constructivists are certainly correct about liberal democracy’s role in constituting the organizations’ most important functions in the post-Soviet era. From the anti-genocidal interventions in the former Yugoslavia to the billions of Euros of structural funds and common markets that have assisted former Soviet states and colonies to escape from cyclical poverty, Brussels has headquartered (even though it has not led) one of the greatest transformations in transatlantic history, one that has resulted in an unprecedented diffusion of individual rights, opportunities, and enfranchisement across Europe. Today, the transatlantic alliance faces difficult choices over whether to admit member-states that could weaken its cohesion, or perhaps lose them

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57 ‘EU makes new bid on Ukraine’s jailed Tymoshenko,’ *Reuters* (2013).
to a rival, regional power. The allies now need to assess institutional reforms to improve transnational governance (especially mitigating veto powers), ones that would allow potential future allies to be admitted into our institutions safely and effectively. While this might delay some countries’ accession to the NATO and the EU in the short-term, such prudence would ensure the continued efficacy of these institutions for a new generation of integrated polities.